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ARTICLES
DISPUTING BOILERPLATE
W. Mark C. Weidemaier∗
Sovereign bond contracts are thought to consist primarily of boilerplate. That
is, except for a handful of custom terms, the contracts are assumed to adopt highly
standardized provisions that are functionally identical to those used in other bond
contracts. Because standardized terms may be “sticky,” this description invokes
significant theoretical baggage. It implies that market participants may select
widely used terms over terms that match their unique preferences.
This Article explores the phenomenon of standardization in the context of a
particular contracting choice: whether to include an arbitration clause in a
sovereign bond contract. These contracts are widely believed to adopt boilerplate
dispute resolution provisions calling for litigation in foreign courts, typically in
New York or England, even though some parties (by hypothesis) would prefer
arbitration. The usual explanation for this discrepancy invokes the inherent
“stickiness” of standard terms. This Article contests this explanation,
demonstrating that contracts are more varied than is often assumed and arguing
that a general preference for litigation, rather than default rule stickiness, may best
explain the relatively infrequent use of arbitration. In the process, the Article
provides a systematic empirical look at the manner in which these bond contracts
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structure the process of enforcing sovereign debt obligations and raises broader
implications for the study of contract innovation and change.
INTRODUCTION
Sovereign bond contracts are thought to consist mostly of boilerplate. That
is, except for a handful of custom terms, the contracts are assumed to adopt
highly standardized provisions that are functionally identical to those used in
other bond contracts.1 The assumption of standardization extends to
enforcement-related terms, including terms in which the issuer consents to be
sued in the event of a default. Thus, the “standard” choice of forum term is
presumed to call for litigation in foreign courts, typically in New York (for New
York-law bonds) or England (for English-law bonds).2
To describe sovereign bond contracts as “standardized,” or “boilerplate,” is
to invoke significant theoretical baggage. For a variety of reasons, standardized
terms may be “sticky.”3 Parties who adopt a standard term may obtain benefits,
while those who depart from the standard may incur costs, and these benefits
and costs may induce even sophisticated parties to select a standard term over a
custom term that matches their unique preferences. Thus, the presumed choice
of forum standard may not evidence a preference for litigation over arbitration
among participants in the sovereign debt markets. This is because the litigation
term is thought to be a sticky default.4
The assumptions underlying this “stickiness” explanation, however, are
largely untested. Do sovereign bonds really contain standardized dispute
resolution terms, and do these terms indeed eschew arbitration for litigation? If
so, why attribute these contracting practices to the stickiness of forum selection
terms rather than, say, a widely held preference for litigation? This Article
explores these questions. In the process, it provides the first systematic empirical
look at the manner in which sovereign bond contracts structure the process of
enforcing sovereign debt obligations. This analysis reveals a richer and more
nuanced picture of how some of the world’s most sophisticated contracting
parties structure the dispute resolution process, and of the likely impact of
standardization on their choices.
Part I begins with an introduction to this unique contracting context, one in
which the threat of legal enforcement plays a relatively minor role. Part I also
introduces the presumptive standard set of choice of forum and other
enforcement-related terms. That standard eschews arbitration in favor of
litigation before creditor-friendly courts in New York or England. Part I closes
1. See infra note 18 and accompanying text for prior research characterizing sovereign bonds as
boilerplate.
2. Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 335, 338 (2006); Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in
International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 732 n.131 (2007).
3. Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 651, 653 (2006).
4. Cross, supra note 2, at 337; Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131.
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by exploring a common explanation for the widespread use of this presumed
standard. This explanation posits that bond contracts choose litigation not
because market participants prefer it to arbitration, but because forum selection
clauses are sticky.
The foregoing discussion suggests the ambiguity inherent in highly
standardized contracts. Do parties simply prefer the standard, or does
standardization deter contract innovation and change? Answering these
questions requires some prior belief as to the parties’ likely preferences, as well
as an analysis of the contracts themselves. Part II engages these questions,
beginning with an assessment of the merits of arbitration as a means of resolving
sovereign debt disputes. I do not purport to offer a definitive resolution. I
suggest, however, that few participants in the sovereign debt markets presently
have strong reasons to prefer arbitration. That conclusion implies that arbitration
clauses may appear infrequently in sovereign bond contracts for reasons having
little or nothing to do with contract stickiness.
Part II next reports findings from an analysis of sovereign bond contracts,
including at least one issuance from virtually every major (and most minor)
issuers of New York- or English-law bonds over the last twenty years. As it turns
out, enforcement-related terms vary to a surprising degree across the different
issuers in my sample. With respect to choice of forum terms, more than twenty
percent of the issuers depart in some way from the presumptive standard,
including nearly ten percent whose bonds include arbitration clauses. Different
issuers also vary in the degree to which they waive sovereign immunity from suit,
from execution, or both. This variance across issuers, however, coexists with
intra-issuer contracting stasis. The issuers in my sample may choose nonstandard
enforcement terms, but they rarely change their own established contracting
practices.
Part III explores the implications of these findings. Contrary to the
stickiness explanation, actual contracting practices suggest that market
participants generally prefer litigation to arbitration in this context. Most issuers
provide for litigation but include broad sovereign immunity waivers in their bond
contracts. This practice captures some of the advantages claimed for arbitration,
without incurring the potential costs and uncertainty associated with a relatively
untested, and unsubsidized, disputing forum. Moreover, when there are unique
reasons to prefer arbitration—as when the issuer’s courts are unlikely to enforce
foreign court judgments—many (though not all) issuers provide for it. And
although issuers rarely change their existing dispute resolution terms, they
presently have little reason to do so.
Part III closes by briefly situating these findings within the broader body of
research into sovereign debt and, more generally, contract innovation and
change. At a basic level, the findings serve as a reminder that actual contracting
practices are often more diverse than expected. This is especially true across the
different issuers in the sample, suggesting that robust models of sovereign debt
contracting practices must take into account a more heterogeneous set of terms
than has previously been thought to exist. The findings also implicate a larger
debate over when and where contract change is likely to occur. Much contracts
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scholarship focuses on innovation by larger and “high-status” players—those
whose economic strength and reputational capital make them ideal “first
movers.” But the variance in enforcement-related terms tells a different story. In
particular, the use of arbitration by relatively minor players in the sovereign debt
world calls for greater attention to the forces that drive innovation among lessestablished and lower-status players.
I.
A.

INTRODUCING THE STANDARD

Sovereign Debt and the Role of Legal Enforcement

In many ways, sovereign bonds are typical debt instruments: tradable bonds
by which governments raise funds from investors, often residents of foreign
countries.5 In loans to private borrowers, the threat of legal enforcement is a
significant inducement for the borrower to repay (and thus, for the lender to
make the loan in the first place). Defaulting borrowers face the prospect of
having their property seized and sold in satisfaction of the debt. For sovereign
borrowers, however, the reality is different. After a default, the sovereign’s own
courts may be unable or unwilling to enforce the debt, and for a number of
reasons courts in other countries may not offer reliable means of legal
enforcement.
One reason for this is the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which until the
latter half of the twentieth century conferred on foreign states absolute immunity
from suit in many jurisdictions, including the United States.6 The doctrine has
been weakened in many jurisdictions, including the United States and United
Kingdom,7 so that sovereigns generally now retain their immunity from suit for
public or governmental, but not for private or commercial, acts.8 Nevertheless,
even if a foreign state is subject to suit and a creditor can obtain a judgment for
the defaulted debt, sovereign issuers remain relatively insulated from the threat

5. Waibel, supra note 2, at 719. Historically, emerging market governments “borrowed from
foreign residents in foreign currency under foreign law,” although this is increasingly no longer the
case. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH U. L.
REV. 1627, 1632–33 (2006). See generally Anna Gelpern, Domestic Bonds, Credit Derivatives, and the
Next Transformation of Sovereign Debt, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147 (2008) (discussing growth in
domestic debt in emerging markets).
6. See Turkmani v. Rep. of Bol., 193 F. Supp. 2d 165, 170–71 (D.D.C. 2002) (explaining that U.S.
government recognized absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity until 1952).
7. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2006); State Immunity
Act, 1978, c. 33, § 2-11 (U.K.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123.
8. HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 124–216, 272–74 (2002) (describing varying
approaches to sovereign immunity throughout world, as well as restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity); Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1075–76 (2004) (describing enactment in U.S. of
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976).
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of legal enforcement.9 The issuer’s assets may be located primarily within its own
borders, where a creditor’s prospects of seizing them are rather dim.10 And even
if the issuer keeps assets in foreign jurisdictions, those assets may be immune
from execution.11 For example, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(“FSIA”) a foreign state’s property located within the United States will likely
be immune from execution unless the property is used for a commercial activity
and either the state has waived its immunity from execution or the property “is
or was used for the commercial activity upon which the [creditor’s] claim is
based.”12 Thus, the coercive mechanisms available to secure payment when
private borrowers fail to pay are of limited use in the sovereign debt context.
The lack of reliable means to enforce sovereign debt obligations has led to a
debate over what role, if any, the threat of legal enforcement plays in enabling
sovereign borrowing.13 Under most accounts, reputational constraints—primarily
the threat of exclusion from future borrowing—serve as the primary inducement
to debt repayment.14 The threat of legal enforcement, however, likely plays at
least some role. At a minimum, the threat of enforcement may impose indirect
costs—for example, by restricting the sovereign’s ability to conduct foreign trade
or preventing it from holding assets in countries where they might be attached.15

9. See Andrei Shleifer, Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 85, 87
(2003) (“Because borrowers in sovereign debt markets are, well, sovereign, creditors have virtually no
rights.”).
10. Id. (“Creditors cannot grab assets in the country. The most they can do is to seize a few
airplanes or barges of oil, which does not get them far except as a strategy of harassment.”); see also
William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004) (“[D]efaulting sovereigns try their best not to leave valuables lying
around.”).
11. See William W. Park, When the Borrower and the Banker Are at Odds: The Interaction of
Judge and Arbitrator in Trans-Border Finance, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1342–43 (1991) (discussing
immunity from execution under U.S. law).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1), (2).
13. Compare Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?, 79 AM.
ECON. REV. 43, 43–44 (1989) (modeling conditions under which legal or political sanctions are
necessary to support sovereign borrowing), with Harold L. Cole et al., Default, Settlement, and
Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt, 36 INT’L ECON. REV. 365,
365, 369–71 (1995) (modeling process in which defaulting countries settle defaulted debt to signal their
intent to repay future loans), and William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default:
American State Debts in the 1840’s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259, 259, 267–72 (1996) (arguing that defaulted
U.S. states repaid debt in order to maintain access to capital markets, rather than to avoid legal,
military, or trade sanctions).
14. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 14 (describing reputation theory as “the dominant
view”); Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of
Coercion, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 551, 588–89 (“What most powerfully explains the willingness of lenders to
treat these promises as credible is a conviction that governments will seek private financing of public
debt into the indefinite future.”).
15. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt, 97 J.
POL. ECON. 155, 158–59 (1989); see also Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 15–16 (describing
enforcement theory of sovereign debt).

6

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

Moreover, while admittedly rare, individual creditors have had some notable
successes in obtaining and executing judgments against defaulted sovereigns.16
Because enforcement matters (at least to a degree), and because sovereign
borrowers default with some frequency,17 it is hardly surprising that sovereign
bond contracts contain detailed terms pertaining to legal enforcement. Most
observers take it as a given that these terms, and indeed most terms in sovereign
bond contracts, are functionally identical—that is, boilerplate.18 Thus, bond
contracts are presumed to contain a “standard” set of terms governing how and
where disputes related to the bonds will be resolved.
B.

The Presumed Dispute Resolution “Standard”

As an example of the dispute resolution standard, consider the “Governing
Law and Jurisdiction” clause in a recent bond offering by the Lebanese
Republic, as described in the prospectus excerpt reprinted as Appendix A. The
clause conforms to one of two perceived standards, reflecting an initial choice
between the law and courts of New York and the law and courts of England.19
Thus, the “standard” begins by selecting between relatively stable and
predictable bodies of law applied by the courts of major (and competing)
financial centers, where cultural and economic factors may exert pressure to
enforce loan agreements.20 The dispute resolution provisions in the Lebanese
bonds choose New York law and provide that the issuer will submit to the
nonexclusive jurisdiction of state or federal courts in Manhattan.21
16. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 8, at 1084–87 (describing litigation by the vulture fund Elliott
Associates and similar attempts to enforce sovereign debt obligations).
17. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Serial Default and the “Paradox” of Rich-to-Poor
Capital Flows, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 53, 53 (2004) (“Throughout history, governments have
demonstrated that ‘serial default’ is the rule, not the exception.”); Shleifer, supra note 9, at 87
(“[O]verborrowing, default, and limited repayment are completely normal and expected by both
borrowers and lenders.”).
18. Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the
International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691, 713–21 (2004); Cross, supra note 2, at 337; Gelpern & Gulati,
supra note 5, at 1628–29; Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131; see also Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati,
Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J.
929, 932 n.7 (2004) (discussing assumption of standardization in sovereign bond contracts).
19. See Cross, supra note 2, at 338 (describing New York and London as “creditor friendly”
jurisdictions).
20. E.g., LEE C. BUCHHEIT, HOW TO NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN AGREEMENTS 134 (2d
ed. 2006) (noting that, from lenders’ perspective, choice of law reflects desire for enforcement
litigation to occur in jurisdictions whose law “strongly favours the enforcement of financial contracts
according to their terms”); Fisch & Gentile, supra note 8, at 1079–81 (describing negative reaction of
New York financial community to Second Circuit ruling invoking act of state doctrine to bar creditor
litigation, and successful efforts to reverse decision).
21. “The Fiscal Agency Agreement and the Notes shall be construed and interpreted in
accordance with the law of the State of New York . . . without reference to conflicts of laws principles.
The Republic irrevocably agrees . . . that the courts of the State of New York and of the United States
sitting in The City of New York, Borough of Manhattan, shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction to settle
any disputes . . . . ” THE LEBANESE REP., BASE PROSPECTUS 99 (Apr. 4, 2007) (detailing U.S.
$22,000,000,000 Global Medium-Term Note Program). As for why the clause specifies courts in
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The clause next contains a package of terms addressing other enforcementrelated matters. These terms include:
• An expansive waiver of sovereign immunity from both jurisdiction
and execution for lawsuits related to the bonds.22 Even without such
a waiver, the issuer would likely be susceptible to suit in the United
States.23 The broad contractual waiver, however, permits
bondholders to avoid litigating whether the particular transaction
falls within the “commercial activity” exception to sovereign
immunity from jurisdiction.24 Moreover, because foreign states also
enjoy broad immunity from attachment and execution against their
property,25 the contractual waiver may expand the scope of property
available to satisfy bondholder claims.26
• Provisions carefully limiting the Republic’s waiver of jurisdictional
immunity to actions related to the bonds, and exempting property
used for official purposes from its waiver of immunity from
execution.27
• A term designating an official to accept service of process in actions
relating to the bonds,28 thereby easing a significant practical
difficulty associated with suing a foreign state.29
Manhattan, see BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 137. “Have you ever been to the South Bronx? Have you
ever spent two consecutive weeks in Troy, New York?” Id.
22. THE LEBANESE REP., supra note 21, at 99–100 (“To the extent that the Republic may in any
jurisdiction claim or acquire for itself or its assets immunity (sovereign or otherwise) from suit,
execution, attachment (whether in aid of execution, before judgment or otherwise) or other legal
process (whether through service or notice or otherwise), the Republic irrevocably agrees for the
benefit of the Holders of Notes not to claim, and irrevocably waives, such immunity, to the fullest
extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction.”).
23. See Rep. of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614–17 (1992) (holding that issuance of
bonds is “commercial activity” for which foreign state is not entitled to immunity under Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006) (creating subject matter jurisdiction
for foreign sovereigns in United States courts under certain enumerated exceptions, including
commercial activities with connection to United States).
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (allowing United States courts jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns
when the sovereign has waived its immunity explicitly or by implication).
25. Id. § 1609.
26. Compare id. § 1610(a)(1) (property used for commercial activity in United States is not
immune if foreign state has waived immunity), with id. § 1610(a)(2) (property used for commercial
activity in United States is not immune if “the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon
which the claim is based” (emphasis added)).
27. THE LEBANESE REP., supra note 21, at 100 (“The waiver of immunity in this paragraph shall
have the fullest scope permitted under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 of the United
States and is intended to be irrevocable for purposes of such Act but shall otherwise constitute a
limited and specific waiver for the purpose of the Fiscal Agency Agreement and the Notes and under
no circumstances shall it be interpreted as a general waiver by the Republic or a waiver of immunity in
respect of property that is used solely or principally for official purposes . . .”).
28. Id. (“The Republic irrevocably appoints the person who from time to time is the Consul of
the Republic in The City of New York as it [sic] agent in the United States to receive service of
process in any Related Proceedings in The City of New York based on or in connection with the Fiscal
Agency Agreement or any of the Notes.”).
29. BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 137–38.
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Thus, the “standard” dispute resolution clause begins with a choice between
the law and courts of New York and the law and courts of England. In either
case, the clause also contains a package of terms that waive the sovereign’s
immunity from suit and (in this case) execution and that address practical
litigation-related concerns such as service of process. At the same time, the
standard clause takes care to ensure that the issuer retains its more expansive
sovereign immunity from suit in other contexts and does not face seizure of
important public or governmental property.30
C.

Sovereign Bonds and Theories of Default Rule “Stickiness”

To describe sovereign bond contracts as “standardized” or “boilerplate” is
to invoke significant theoretical baggage. Suppose, for example, that participants
in sovereign debt markets had reason to favor arbitration over litigation in the
event of a default. Shouldn’t sovereign bond contracts quickly incorporate such a
value-maximizing term? The answer, many would assert, is “No.”31 This answer
implicates a body of contract theory exploring the ways in which standardization
can deter contract innovation.32 A number of theoretical approaches predict that
parties will be reluctant to depart from default terms.33 Of these, network theory
is the most prominent in the sovereign debt context.34
1.

Network and Learning Effects and Switching Costs

Why would sophisticated contracting parties agree to a set of standardized
terms when they would prefer different ones? One answer is that standardized
terms confer value because many have used them in the past (“learning effects”),
because many use them now or are likely to do so in the future (“network
effects”), and because there are costs associated with producing new terms
(“switching costs”).35
30. These latter exemptions serve an obvious function: “If a foreign bank were to attempt to levy
against the Presidential Palace or the state orphanage, for example, this would almost certainly prompt
a phone call to the unfortunate lawyer who negotiated the loan agreement on behalf of the sovereign
borrower.” Id. at 143.
31. E.g., Cross, supra note 2, at 374–77 (extending network theory to choice of forum terms in
sovereign bonds); Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131 (disputing value of arbitration under
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes but noting that sovereign bonds “display
tremendous inertia against change (for example, to include arbitration clauses)”).
32. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 289–305 (1985)
(exploring how state provision of default rules may combine with other barriers to impede contract
innovation).
33. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 3, at 655–60.
34. See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 18, at 710–28 (using network theory to explain patterns of stasis
and change in sovereign bond contracts); Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 932 & n.7 (focusing on
inclusion of collective action clauses in sovereign bonds governed by New York law, and presenting
evidence consistent with network theory); Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1629 (explaining
application of network theory to complex financial contracts, including sovereign bonds).
35. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting
(or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719–29 (1997).
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For example, by choosing a term that has been widely used in the past,
contracting parties may benefit from prior users’ experience with the term. Early
users of contract terms thus generate positive externalities from which later users
benefit.36 These learning effects may include certainty as to the term’s meaning
and validity resulting from an established body of precedent.37 Prior users may
have eliminated errors in the term’s formulation over multiple drafting
iterations.38 Common terms also may be familiar to important third parties, such
as lawyers and investment bankers, who have developed expertise associated
with the term.39 Importantly, where contracts are actively traded, the use of a
standard term also may reduce the cost to investors and analysts of pricing the
contract.40
Similar benefits—termed “network effects”—may accrue to parties who
select terms that are commonly used now, or that will be commonly used in the
future.41 Thus, as use of a term becomes widespread, judicial interpretation may
clarify its meaning, and third parties, including investors, may develop expertise
in evaluating the term’s significance and pricing implications.42 These network
effects also constitute positive, inter-firm externalities.43 But unlike learning
effects, which flow only from early to later users of a contract term, “[n]etwork
externalities run in two directions in the sense that all users benefit from one
another’s contemporaneous use of the product, regardless of when they started
using it.”44
Finally, an analogous set of intra-firm benefits may accrue from the
repeated use of a contract term within a single firm.45 When present, these
benefits may result in switching costs that deter the firm from adopting a new
term.46 Parties who adopt nonstandard terms, or who depart from their past
practices, may incur error costs. Judges may interpret the new term in
unanticipated ways,47 or the term may fail to address an unforeseen
contingency.48 For actively traded contracts, moreover, investors may have
difficulty pricing the nonstandard term or may discount the term to reflect the

36. Id. at 724.
37. Id. at 722.
38. Id. at 721. But see Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 59, 60, 80–81 (2001) (noting that multiple iterations may fail to correct, or may even worsen,
contract defects).
39. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 723.
40. Id. at 723–24; see also Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting
that uniformity of contract terms makes it easier for investors and advisors to compare issues).
41. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 725.
42. Id. at 726.
43. Id. at 727.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 727–29.
46. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 727.
47. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 32, at 283–84 (discussing risk of interpretation error).
48. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 720.
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cost of assessing its value.49 Beyond this, use of a nonstandard term may signal
negative information to the market, perhaps an increased likelihood of default in
a lending transaction.50 Thus,
[s]witching may be costly for a single firm because it takes time and
effort to produce a new term that works . . . [and t]here is no guarantee
that investors, analysts, and judges will interpret a new term in a way
that is favorable to its original proponent or . . . that others will adopt
the term in the foreseeable future.51
These benefits and costs have implications for the degree of standardization
we should expect in contracts. As applied to contracting behavior, network
theory posits that learning and network benefits may lead contracts to be more
standardized than would otherwise be the case.52 Parties may forego a valuemaximizing term in favor of a “standardized term subject to network
externalities.”53 Likewise, switching costs may deter parties from revising
existing contracts, either to take advantage of a market “standard” or to choose
a nonstandard term that is nevertheless superior to a term in the firm’s existing
contracts.54 Put differently: network theory posits that standardization can serve
as a barrier to contract innovation and change.55
49. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV.
757, 785 (1995); see also FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK
SHARING 122 (1994) (“If a novel security must earn an uncertainty premium, there is an incentive to
issue standard securities which do not bear this premium. The private returns from standardization
may lead to coordination failure, that is, the market may fail to innovate, or it may coordinate on the
‘wrong’ security.”).
50. Ahdieh, supra note 18, at 716–16; Klausner, supra note 49, at 785. For a related point, see
Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 3, at 652.
[I]n the presence of a familiar and commonly utilized background provision . . . a transactor
might fear that proposing an opt-out from the default will dissuade his potential
counterparty from entering into the agreement. The fear is that the counterparty will suspect
that the proposer’s decision to deviate from the norm and use an unfamiliar provision hides
some unknown problem.
Id.
51. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1629.
52. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 729. Conversely, in some cases contracting parties may
have insufficient incentives to adopt terms that will confer network externalities on future users. Id. at
730. But see Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 931 n.2 (noting that, to extent sovereign bond contracts
are already heavily standardized, this concern is less likely).
53. Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 930–31.
54. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 727–29.
55. The impact of learning and network effects on contracting behavior has been questioned on
theoretical and empirical grounds. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications
of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 569–76, 587 (1998) (expressing skepticism that
contract terms generate significant interpretive network effects); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 82, 128 (2001)
(concluding, from study of closely held firms’ choice between limited liability company and limited
liability partnership forms, that characteristics of relevant business form were more significant factors
in choice of organizational form than were network externalities). Nevertheless, it is widely assumed
that sovereign bond contracts are highly standardized and network theory is commonly invoked in
analyses of sovereign bond contracts. See generally Choi & Gulati, supra note 18 (arguing sovereign
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Network Theory as Applied to Enforcement-Related Terms

Recently, there has been increased interest in arbitration’s potential as a
forum for resolving sovereign debt disputes. Some scholars and advocates have
argued that issuers, investors, or both would be better off arbitrating sovereign
debt disputes, especially before the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), than litigating those disputes before New York
or English courts.56 The case for arbitration principally rests on two asserted
benefits: neutrality and enforceability.57 The first benefit rests on the claim that
arbitrators—because selected and paid by the disputants—are less susceptible to
political and other pressures than are locally elected or politically appointed
judges.58 For this reason, issuers might prefer arbitration to litigation before
foreign courts.59 The second benefit rests on the claim that, in some cases,
arbitration awards may be easier to enforce than court judgments.60 Under the
FSIA, for example, a successful arbitration claimant may be able to attach and
execute upon a broader range of property within the United States than a
successful litigant in court.61 And even within the sovereign’s own borders, a
number of multilateral treaties may facilitate the enforcement of arbitration
awards.62
The belief that arbitration offers these advantages,63 paired with the
assumption that New York- and English-law bonds adopt boilerplate terms

bond contracts remain standardized due to factors other than preference); Gelpern & Gulati, supra
note 5 (stating that prevalent explanation for boilerplate is network effects).
56. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 2, at 354–65 (arguing that arbitration offers benefits to issuers and
creditors); Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders
(Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=140069 (suggesting that
Argentina would voluntarily comply with ICSID awards).
57. See generally Cross, supra note 2, for a forceful articulation of arbitration’s potential
advantages.
58. Cross, supra note 2, at 355.
59. Id. For a related point about likely state preferences for dependent adjudicators such as
arbitrators, see Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CAL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2005).
60. Cross, supra note 2, at 356–65; Waibel, supra note 2, at 758; Memorandum from Owen C. Pell
to the Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders, supra note 56.
61. Cross, supra note 2, at 358–59; Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of
Argentina Bondholders, supra note 56.
62. See Cross, supra note 2, at 361–62 (noting that one advantage of ICSID arbitration is that
ICSID awards are directly enforceable in member states’ courts); Waibel, supra note 2, at 758 (stating
that use of ICSID changes sovereign debt adjudication “from a private, into an international, dispute
between states” and that “noncompliance with an ICSID award amounts to an international—and
very public—breach”); Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of Argentina
Bondholders, supra note 56 (explaining that, while enforcement of U.S. judgments is uncertain in
other countries, ICSID judgments are treated as judgments rendered by courts of the enforcing
jurisdiction).
63. Not all agree that arbitration of sovereign debt disputes would be a beneficial development.
See Waibel, supra note 2, at 715, 757–58 (objecting that ICSID arbitration could “blow a hole” in
sovereign’s ability to restructure sovereign debt instruments).
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calling for litigation in New York or England,64 gives rise to a puzzle: Why don’t
bonds provide for arbitration? Network theory seems to offer a ready answer.65
Bond contracts governed by New York or English law seek to tap into relatively
robust bodies of law regarding the enforceability of sovereign debt obligations
and the application of sovereign immunity and other defenses.66 Widespread use
of choice of forum terms calling for litigation in New York or England may have
contributed to the development of this law. Likewise, widespread use of New
York and English courts may have developed expertise among members of the
relevant legal and judicial communities.67 By adopting the standard choice of
forum term, new bonds might access (and continue to generate) these benefits.
Similar benefits could be hypothesized for other enforcement-related terms, such
as sovereign immunity waivers. For example, bonds that adopt boilerplate
language might tap into existing precedent interpreting the waiver, access
professional expertise as to the term’s meaning and validity, and reduce the cost
to market participants of pricing the immunity term.68
Parties who select nonstandard dispute resolution terms may forego these
benefits and incur a related set of costs. In theory, of course, contracting parties
may obtain the benefit of their chosen law in any forum. Arbitrators, for
example, will likely honor contract terms instructing them to apply New York
law. But judicial review of arbitral awards is generally limited,69 and arbitrators
have a reputation—perhaps undeserved—of basing their decisions on equitable
principles.70 Arbitration may also raise procedural uncertainties, such as whether
64. See Cross, supra note 2, at 338–41, 340 & n.22 (identifying Brazil and Ukraine—and possibly
other non-EU member issuers located in former Eastern bloc—as only nations to include arbitration
clauses in sovereign debt contracts); Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131 (“[S]overeign bonds are
‘conservative’ financial instruments whose contractual terms display tremendous inertia against
change (for example, to include arbitration clauses)”).
65. Cross, supra note 2, at 374; Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131.
66. See, e.g., BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 130 (stating New York and London have welldeveloped law, which results in predictable interpretation of contract terms); Fisch & Gentile, supra
note 8, at 1075–88, 1097 (discussing developments in sovereign debt litigation and legal doctrine).
67. On the development of law related to sovereign debt obligations, primarily but not
exclusively by courts located in New York, see Fisch & Gentile, supra note 8, at 1075–88.
68. For example, U.S. law requires separate waivers of the sovereign’s immunity from suit and
immunity from execution. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) (2006); FOX, supra note 8, at 146. Selecting New
York courts as the situs for litigation would help ensure that an immunity waiver referencing the
sovereign “or its assets” would be interpreted to waive immunity from execution. See, e.g., Karaha
Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d 70, 82–83 (2d Cir.
2002) (finding sovereign immunity waived because contract included such language). In truth,
however, judicial opinions interpreting contractual waivers of immunity are rare, so it is questionable
whether these contract terms generate significant interpretive network effects. Perhaps a better
explanation is that the widespread selection of courts in New York and England develops
constituencies—such as lawyers and investment bankers—with the power to influence court practices.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a discussion of how cultural and economic factors may
influence choice of law provisions.
69. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
V, done June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (stating that recognition and enforcement of
arbitration award may be refused only under certain enumerated conditions).
70. E.g., Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74
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creditors will have recourse to summary enforcement procedures and
preliminary measures of relief often available in court.71 Such uncertainty might
impact borrowing costs. Sovereign bonds are actively traded on secondary
markets, and investors may demand a premium if they are to hold an unfamiliar
security.72 Moreover, the choice of a nonstandard term may signal adverse
information about the issuer’s likelihood of default.73 After all, why tinker with
perfectly good enforcement boilerplate unless the issuer or its underwriters are
already thinking about default?74
Nevertheless, while the foregoing story is plausible, it is no more than that.
It is not self-evident that arbitration offers benefits in this context, that sovereign
bonds indeed adopt boilerplate enforcement terms, or that any uniformity in
contracting practices should be attributed to contract stickiness rather than
preference.75 In any event, the assumptions underlying the network story remain
largely untested.76 Do participants in the sovereign debt markets really have
reason to prefer arbitration? If they do, does standardization pose a meaningful
barrier to contract change for such a sophisticated set of parties?77 These
questions are complicated by the ambiguity inherent in any given set of
contracting practices. A high degree of standardization across sovereign bonds
need not imply suboptimal contracting; market participants may simply prefer
the standard term.78 Likewise, variance across bond terms might or might not
evidence optimal contracting practices by parties with diverse preferences.79 To

TUL. L. REV. 39, 42–46 (1999) (stating that arbitration has traditionally been perceived as “speedy,
cheap, and equitable”).
71. See Cross, supra note 2, at 371–74 (discussing uncertainty associated with whether summary
procedures and interim relief, both available under New York law, are available in arbitration).
72. Ahdieh, supra note 18, at 714; Douglas Gale, Standard Securities, in FINANCIAL INNOVATION
AND RISK SHARING, supra note 49, at 309, 309.
73. Klausner, supra note 49, at 785.
74. Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131 (“[S]overeign bonds with arbitration clauses . . . could
implicitly recognize the possibility of eventual default and thereby negatively affect their
marketability; the inclusion of arbitration clauses is therefore generally avoided, leaving domestic
courts the forum of choice.”).
75. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 3, at 655–60 (discussing varied analytical approaches to
understanding stickiness of default terms).
76. In Westlaw and LexisNexis searches of the disclosure documents that some sovereign issuers
file with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Professor Karen Halverson Cross found that only
one of sixteen issuers—Brazil—used arbitration, and also noted the possibility that former Easternbloc issuers who are not European Union members (such as Ukraine) might use arbitration. See Cross,
supra note 2, at 339–41 & n.22 (also citing prior study of thirteen issuers that found only Brazil using
arbitration).
77. See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 930 (“The parties involved are among the most
sophisticated in the world financial markets.”).
78. Cf. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 55, at 119 (noting, in connection with choice of
corporate form, that continued incorporation may evidence that some firms prefer that form).
79. Standardization might “reflect maximization of positive interpretive network effects or . . .
suboptimal tipping.” Lemley & McGowan, supra note 55, at 498. Likewise, variance might “reflect the
optimal convergence of heterogeneous firms with heterogeneous governance provisions or . . .
opportunity costs of not using a standard term.” Id.
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make sense of the pattern, we need to assess both market participants’ likely
preferences and whether their contracts appear to conflict with these
preferences. Part II of this Article engages these questions, beginning with an
assessment of the merits of arbitration as a means of resolving sovereign debt
disputes.
II.
A.

SOVEREIGN DEBT ARBITRATION: THEORY AND FACT

Arbitration’s Uncertain Benefits

For now, let us assume that the dispute resolution terms in sovereign bond
contracts are indeed boilerplate—functionally identical—and that they eschew
arbitration for litigation before courts in England or New York. There is nothing
intrinsically puzzling about this state of affairs. The parties simply may prefer to
resolve their disputes in court, or they may be sufficiently uncertain about the
benefits of arbitration that they do not wish to experiment. Indeed, although
arbitration clauses may be relatively common in some cross-border
transactions,80 they appear infrequently in commercial lending contracts.81 The
usual explanation for this is that commercial lending contracts involve relatively
settled law that is predictably applied by creditor-friendly courts, often through
summary procedures (unavailable in arbitration) that reduce enforcement
costs.82 Add to this the fact that sovereign debt litigation involves vast sums of
money, and it is perhaps to be expected that market participants will opt for the
full procedural rights and appellate review available in court.83
80. Stephen R. Bond, Commentary, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 57, 59 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds.,
2005) (reporting that fifteen of seventeen (roughly eighty-eight percent) of international joint venture
agreements studied included an arbitration clause).
81. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 350, 351 tbl.2 (2007) (finding low incidence of arbitration clauses in variety of
commercial contracts filed with Securities and Exchange Commission, including lending contracts);
William W. Park, Arbitration in Banking and Finance, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 213, 215–16 (1998)
(discussing low incidence of arbitration in lending contracts and citing, as one reason, that “default
usually results from simple inability or unwillingness to pay, rather than any honest divergence in the
interpretation of complex or ambiguous contract terms”). Arbitration clauses may be more common in
consumer financial transactions. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to
Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62, 63 tbl.2 (2004) (finding arbitration clauses in eighteen of twenty-six (roughly
sixty-nine percent) consumer financial contracts). Unlike most commercial lending arrangements,
these are contracts in which the lender expects to engage in a high volume of routine collections
activity and also incurs the risk of becoming a class action defendant.
82. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 231 (2000) (noting that courts have experience with (typically
unambiguous) loan contracts and that arbitration may lessen deterrence benefits of litigation); Park,
supra note 81, at 215–16 (stating financial institutions may find going to court easier than arbitration,
particularly given “benefit of summary procedures for the enforcement of promissory notes and other
commercial paper obligations”).
83. In similar fashion, parties are thought to avoid arbitration in “bet the company” cases, “in
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As noted previously, however, some have argued that issuers and
bondholders should prefer arbitration to litigation in New York or England. For
issuers, the advantage is the perceived neutrality of arbitration relative to the
judges in these jurisdictions.84 For bondholders, the perceived advantage stems
from the fact that arbitration awards may in some circumstances be easier to
enforce than court judgments.85 Either of these benefits might induce parties to
include arbitration clauses in sovereign bond contracts.86 For example, if
arbitration awards were easier to enforce, even issuers that would prefer to
litigate might accept arbitration if doing so reduced borrowing costs. This
scenario would be most likely if bondholders believed that arbitration facilitated
the orderly collection of defaulted debt and thus increased the cost of default to
the issuer. Alternatively, even if bondholders believed arbitration to be an
inferior enforcement forum—say because arbitrators are more likely to accept
the sovereign’s arguments in default-related disputes—they might accept
arbitration in exchange for higher returns. This latter scenario seems unlikely, as
I presume that most issuers prefer to minimize borrowing costs.87 Nevertheless,
the following discussion evaluates both the “neutrality” and “ease of
enforcement” benefits claimed for arbitration.
I do not argue that arbitration is an inappropriate forum for resolving
sovereign debt disputes or deny that some market participants might have reason
to prefer it to litigation in New York or England.88 But I do claim that its
benefits are quite speculative and likely to be modest if they do exist. Thus, few
participants in the sovereign debt markets are likely to prefer arbitration, and
which an erroneous outcome could jeopardize the continued existence of the company.” Christopher
R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 79
(2008); see also ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS 603 (4th ed. 2006) (“[A] party for whom the stakes and risk of loss are high may for that
reason become less interested in ‘informality’ – and more reluctant to chance a decision without
having taken every possible advantage of the full panoply of legal procedures” available in court.).
84. Both scholars and advocates have made this case. Professor Karen Halverson Cross has made
the most thorough and forceful articulation of arbitration’s potential benefits. Cross, supra note 2, at
354–65. For an argument that holders of defaulted Argentine bonds should invoke ICSID arbitration
pursuant to arbitration provisions in bilateral investment treaties between Argentina and other
countries, see Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders,
supra note 56.
85. Cross, supra note 2, at 356–65; Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of
Argentina Bondholders, supra note 56; see also Park, supra note 11, at 217–20 (discussing potential
enforcement advantages of arbitration).
86. For a model of the choice between arbitration and litigation, see Christopher R. Drahozal,
Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 523, 531–32 (2005). Drahozal explains that parties will choose arbitration if the marginal benefit
of arbitration exceeds its marginal cost and, in cases where arbitration benefits only one party, that
party makes a transfer payment to induce the other party’s assent. Id.
87. The widespread use of choice of forum terms calling for litigation in New York or England is
consistent with this assumption. Issuers could, of course, attempt to negotiate more favorable choice of
forum terms, and at least some do. See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text for examples of
issuers who have adopted more favorable choice of forum terms than what is standard.
88. See generally Park, supra note 11 (providing additional analysis of arbitration’s role in crossborder lending transactions).
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fewer still are likely to prefer it strongly enough to expend negotiating capital in
pursuit of an arbitration clause.89
1.

The Questionable Case for Neutrality

Consider first the notion that arbitrators are “neutral”—free of political and
other bias90—and therefore should be more agreeable to sovereign borrowers.
This notion runs counter to a great deal of historical skepticism about arbitration
among developing nations in particular.91 The “neutrality” argument, however,
suggests that this skepticism may be misplaced. Yet the term “neutrality” is
worth unpacking, because it is potentially misleading in the context of
arbitration.
Begin by distinguishing two separate concepts related to “neutrality”: the
concept of competitive constraint and the concept of bias. Arbitrators are
competitively constrained because they must be selected by both parties, typically
after a dispute arises, from a pool of competing arbitrators. This means that if
sovereign borrowers and their creditors have sufficient access to information
about arbitrators’ prior awards—a debatable assumption in many contexts, but
not unreasonable here—each will prefer to avoid arbitrators whose awards are
unfavorable relative to those of others in the pool.92 In such a case, we might
characterize the awards of successful arbitrators as statistically exchangeable:
“[T]he strategy of a successful (i.e., enduring) arbitrator is to provide decisions
that are forecasts of the decisions other arbitrators will make in similar
situations.”93 The point is straightforward: arbitrators will not get much business
if their rulings predictably depart from what their competitors would do in

89. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 55, at 588 (making a similar point with regard to
financial contracts generally).
90. Cross, supra note 2, at 355.
91. See infra notes 100, 104–05 and accompanying text for a discussion of skepticism regarding
neutrality of arbitrators.
92. At present, because of the relatively small number of investment treaty arbitrations,
especially in the context of sovereign debt instruments, there will be relatively few prior awards to
consider. This may increase the uncertainty inherent in the process of arbitrator selection. Over time
this would change, but in the short term parties (perhaps especially creditors) may prefer a forum they
perceive to offer more certainty.
93. Orley Ashenfelter, Arbitration and the Negotiation Process, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 342, 343
(1987).
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similar cases.94 This notion of competitive constraint is a component of arbitrator
“neutrality.”95
Importantly, the fact that arbitrators are subject to competitive constraint
does not mean that they are unbiased. Nothing prevents the parties from
agreeing to arbitrate before a pool of arbitrators whose awards tend towards bias
in one party’s favor. To see the point, consider the familiar example of a contract
between a business and a consumer—say, a ticket for a cruise in the Pacific—
which includes a choice of forum clause selecting Florida state courts.96 Assume
that Florida state judges are generally sympathetic to the cruise industry. In a
sense, the forum is “biased” against consumers; certainly it is less favorable than
alternatives.97 The bias would not disappear if Florida procedural rules allowed
litigants to strike unfavorable judges. No doubt the parties would steer clear of
the most (and least) biased judges, but that would not ensure “neutrality.”
The process of arbitrator selection involves a similar dynamic, most
obviously when the parties choose the arbitrator or arbitrators from a list
provided by an administering institution, such as the American Arbitration
Association, designated in the contract. In this “list” process, the parties strike
unfavorable arbitrators from the list, rank the rest according to preference, and
the administering institution appoints the most highly ranked arbitrator or
arbitrators acceptable to both parties.98 This process allows each party to
eliminate unfavorable arbitrators but not to ensure the appointment of any one
in particular. And, of course, their choices are constrained by the arbitrators on
the roster maintained by the administering institution. In international disputes
featuring three-arbitrator panels, it is more common for each party to appoint an
arbitrator and for the two party-appointed arbitrators, or some neutral
appointing authority, to appoint the third.99 Nevertheless, the choice of
94. This is not to say that such distributional concerns are the only considerations that shape
arbitrator selection decisions. For example, considerations often grouped loosely under the heading of
procedural justice—perceptions that the process is fair and that participants are treated with respect,
and other process and interactional concerns—may also shape the parties’ choices. See generally
Richard A. Posthuma et al., Arbitrator Acceptability: Does Justice Matter?, 39 INDUS. REL. 313 (2000);
Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 211 (2004).
95. Cross, supra note 2, at 370 (stating that arbitrators have incentives to render decisions that
are “responsive to the interests of the parties” because their “reputation and prospects for future work
hinge on their satisfaction”).
96. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587–88 (1991).
97. Consumers might have to pay a higher price for these alternatives. This point emphasizes that
dispute resolution terms impact the overall allocation of risks and rewards in the transaction. Choice
of a borrower-friendly forum may prompt the lender to demand concessions elsewhere in the
agreement. In the sovereign debt context, if arbitrators are less “biased”—i.e., more likely to accept
the sovereign issuer’s arguments in default-related litigation—bondholders might demand higher
returns if they perceive this to increase the risk of default.
98. See, e.g., United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration
Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 6 (Apr. 28, 1976) (establishing default appointment process for singlearbitrator cases); COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES R-11 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 2009)
(establishing process for selection of arbitrators after parties have conferred).
99. E.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 98, art. 7. This is the default method for
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arbitrator, and especially the choice of the third, “presiding” arbitrator, remains
effectively constrained by the pool of arbitrators deemed suitable for
international arbitration, and this is an elite group hailing primarily, though not
exclusively, from Western countries.100
What does this mean for sovereign debt arbitration? Arbitrators may be
“neutral” in the sense of being competitively constrained. Thus, in addition to
appointing one of the three arbitrators, each party can be reasonably assured
that the third, presiding arbitrator will not fall too far outside the mainstream.101
Sovereign issuers, therefore, may well prefer this aspect of arbitration to the
“standard” dispute resolution provision calling for litigation in New York or
England; at least in arbitration they can participate in selecting the decision
maker.102 But this does not necessarily mean that the overall pool of arbitrators
will be unbiased, or that arbitrators will produce substantially “better” results,
from the perspective of sovereign borrowers, than the judges who preside over
these national courts.
I do not assert that arbitration—before ICSID panels or otherwise—is in
fact biased in favor of foreign investors.103 But it is clear that many governments
appointing arbitrators under ICSID. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 37(2)(b), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 160; ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration
Rules), Rule 3 (Apr. 10, 2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp
(follow “English PDF” hyperlink).
100. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 93–97
(1996) (discussing development and limits of market in “third-world legal expertise” and noting that
arbitrators from third-world countries are rarely appointed president of arbitral tribunal); John
Beechey, International Commercial Arbitration: A Process Under Review and Change, DISP. RESOL. J.,
Aug.–Oct. 2000, at 32, 33 (finding many arbitrator appointments continue to come from small group of
English-speaking lawyers from Western countries with known track record); Susan D. Franck,
Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 78–79 (2007)
(reporting that seventy-five percent of arbitrators in her sample came from Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development countries); Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International
Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 965–70 (2005) (discussing developments in market for
international arbitrator services, including likelihood that arbitrators will favor appointment of other
“members” of the “club”).
101. As noted in the text, it is common in international arbitrations for each party to appoint an
arbitrator of its choosing, and neither can block the other’s appointment except in unusual cases.
Nevertheless, the parties do have some control over the selection of the presiding arbitrator. If the
presiding arbitrator is to be selected by agreement, each party may control the selection directly by
rejecting arbitrators it deems unacceptable. If the presiding arbitrator is to be selected by the partyappointed arbitrators or by some neutral appointing authority, the parties influence the selection less
directly. Yet few party-appointed arbitrators or appointing institutions will knowingly appoint as
president an arbitrator whose past decisions can be viewed as aberrant.
102. In this sense, the likely issuer preference for arbitration invokes the distinction between
independent and dependent international tribunals, with the former characterized by greater
institutional separation from the state parties involved. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 59, at 7–8
(noting that conventional wisdom favors independence for international tribunals). There is some
theoretical and empirical support for the view that dependent tribunals, over which state parties have
greater control, are more successful. Id.
103. One study reveals no obvious pro-investor bias at ICSID, although the study does not
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and advocacy groups claim that it is biased.104 To an extent, these claims may
simply be an effort to exert leverage and to shape arbitrators’ behavior, but they
also reflect skepticism about investment arbitration among developing countries
in particular.105 And, as the foregoing discussion suggests, this skepticism is not
inconsistent with the fact that arbitrators operate in a competitive marketplace,
nor with the fact that arbitrators are less susceptible to political pressures than
judges. Indeed, the fact that competitive constraint does not ensure lack of bias
can be demonstrated empirically, even in arbitration systems created by parties
with relatively equal negotiating leverage and information. For example, there is
some evidence of pro-team bias in Major League Baseball arbitration, a system
populated by sophisticated and well-informed repeat players.106 Thus, it is at
least open to question whether sovereign borrowers, especially emerging market
countries, should strongly prefer existing arbitration systems even to courts in
New York and London.107
Another facet of arbitration bears mention: It is financed by the parties
themselves. National courts are heavily subsidized by taxpayers, but arbitration
tribunals must be paid by the parties, and these costs may be shifted to the losing
party. There is no reliable evidence of the costs of ICSID arbitration, but the
costs may be substantial. One study found that tribunal costs alone (primarily

permit any assessment of the merits of the claims adjudicated or any comparison to the results that
might be expected in litigation. Franck, supra note 100, at 83–85.
104. E.g., Beechey, supra note 100, at 32, 33 (noting skepticism among developing nations about
international arbitration); Letter from Food & Water Watch, USA et al., to Ana Palacio, Sec’y Gen. of
ICSID (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/world-water/right/icsidletter (stating, in letter sent on behalf of 134 organizations supporting Bolivia’s decision to withdraw
from ICSID, “ICSID represents the inequities of an international system biased against the developing
countries”); Emad Mekay, Bias Seen in Int’l Dispute Arbiters, INTER PRESS SERV., June 19, 2004,
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38229 (noting that while most ICSID cases are against
developing nations, most arbitrators “hail from industrialized countries”).
105. For an overview of historic (but diminished) skepticism about arbitration, see generally Amr
A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of
Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419 (2000). See also Catherine A. Rogers, The Arrival of the “HaveNots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 356–60 (2007) (exploring reasons for state resistance
to international investment arbitration).
106. See generally John D. Burger & Stephen J.K. Walters, Arbitrator Bias and Self-Interest:
Lessons from the Baseball Labor Market, 26 J. LAB. RES. 267 (2005).
107. It bears repeating that if arbitrators are more likely to produce “issuer-friendly” decisions,
bondholders might demand a premium for holding bonds that introduced such uncertainty into
enforcement proceedings. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text for a discussion of related
costs and benefits. None of the arguments for the use of sovereign debt arbitration, however, suggest
that issuers would be willing to make such a transfer payment. Thus, another component of the
arbitrator “neutrality” argument suggests that issuers might find it “less of an intrusion on [their]
sovereignty” to submit a dispute to an independent arbitrator than to submit to the jurisdiction of
courts in New York or England. Cross, supra note 2, at 355. Some issuers indeed may perceive
arbitration to offer this benefit. Cf. Harvey D. Shapiro, The Sovereign Borrowing Battle: Who Has
Jurisdiction if a Government Is Sued?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1977, at 56 (discussing
borrowers’ resistance to foreign court jurisdiction). But it is hardly clear that this will be a common
perception. Nor is it clear that issuers would value this benefit so highly that they would accept higher
disputing costs or higher borrowing costs to obtain it.
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arbitrator fees) averaged almost $600,000 per ICSID case and that governments
paid slightly over half that amount.108 These figures do not include legal fees and
other litigation costs, which may dwarf costs associated with the tribunal itself.109
To be sure, these costs may be modest compared to the aggregate claims
asserted against defaulting issuers. But they are not trivial.110 Indeed, it is
entirely possible that aggregate disputing costs would be substantially greater in
arbitration. If that is so, we should not be surprised if sovereign borrowers and
their creditors prefer to have taxpayers subsidize their disputes.
2.

Are Arbitration Awards Easier to Enforce?

Despite these concerns, issuers might consent to arbitration if doing so
reduced borrowing costs. If arbitration facilitated the collection of defaulted
debt, bondholders might prefer it to litigation and accept lower returns from
bonds that included arbitration clauses.111 Indeed, an issuer might agree to
arbitration to signal its low likelihood of default. But there are reasons to doubt
arbitration’s enforcement benefits. One such reason is the possibility that
arbitrators will less rigorously enforce loan obligations, thus reducing the
deterrent effect of enforcement proceedings.112 This possibility is often invoked
to explain why commercial loan agreements rarely include arbitration clauses.113
This section offers two additional reasons for doubting arbitration’s enforcement
benefits in the sovereign debt context. First, it is unlikely that the incremental
international pressure associated with unpaid arbitration awards would prompt
voluntary payment. Second, bond contracts that provide for litigation may obtain
some of the enforcement benefits claimed for arbitration by including broad
waivers of sovereign immunity. Such a practice would capture some of
arbitration’s potential benefits without incurring any of the associated costs and
uncertainty.
Begin with the prospect of voluntary payment. Creditors historically have
had little ability to enforce sovereign debt obligations in the issuer’s courts, and
sovereign borrowers may not keep substantial assets in jurisdictions with relaxed
approaches to sovereign immunity.114 Thus, the coercive mechanisms available
to secure payment when corporate borrowers fail to pay are of limited use in the
sovereign debt context. But perhaps arbitration awards are more likely than
108. See Franck, supra note 100, at 68–69 (reporting results from only seventeen cases).
109. In addition to the parties’ own litigation costs, the tribunal may require the losing party to
pay some or all of the other party’s litigation costs. See id. at 69–70 (reporting results from small
subsample of ICSID awards and noting that, in five cost-shifting cases in which award contained
relevant information, sovereign contributed average of $927,635 to investor’s legal costs).
110. The costs cited above are per-dispute costs, not an estimate of the total cost of resolving all
claims arising out of a default.
111. If arbitration is inferior from an enforcement perspective, bondholders would presumably
view arbitration clauses negatively and perhaps demand higher returns for holding such securities.
112. Hylton, supra note 82, at 231.
113. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the infrequency with which
commercial lending contracts include arbitration clauses.
114. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 11–13.
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court judgments to induce voluntary payment. Unlike failure to pay a court
judgment, failure to pay an award issued by an ICSID tribunal violates an
international treaty.115 Moreover, the World Bank, with which ICSID is closely
associated, would prefer not to see ICSID awards routinely go unpaid and might
pressure sovereigns to pay awards, perhaps threatening to deny future lending.116
These additional pressures might lead to voluntary payment.117
While not completely implausible, this suggestion is hardly self-evident.118 It
seems equally if not more likely that any additional pressure associated with an
ICSID award would be of modest significance. “Unlike corporate borrowers,
sovereigns do not necessarily default because they cannot pay.”119 Default may
already impose significant costs on the issuer, generating international pressure
and limiting its future access to credit markets.120 Nevertheless, the issuer may
default if these costs are outweighed by the political and economic costs of
servicing its existing (largely foreign-owned) debt.121 Whatever the reason,
default is typically followed by efforts to restructure the outstanding debt, efforts
whose success depends at least in part on obtaining bondholders’ consent to the
restructuring.122 Thus, the issuer will presumably be disinclined to pay awards
voluntarily, lest it encourage creditors to hold out and potentially disrupt its
restructuring efforts. In this context, it seems unlikely that any incremental cost
of international pressure due to unpaid arbitration awards (over and above the
cost to the issuer of ignoring court judgments) will induce payment. Such cases
might exist, but it is hard to believe they will be common.

115. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, supra note 99, art. 53; CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY 1088–90 (2001).
116. Cross, supra note 2, at 363.
117. Id. at 362–63; see also Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of
Argentina Bondholders, supra note 56 (stating experience shows that nations pay ICSID awards).
There is some, albeit mixed, empirical evidence suggesting higher rates of state compliance with the
judgments of “dependent” tribunals like arbitration. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 59, at 38, 48
(finding increased compliance in cases where jurisdiction of International Court of Justice is more
closely tied to party consent; also finding roughly equivalent compliance with GATT and WTO
adjudication mechanisms). For a discussion of problems in measuring compliance rates, see id. at 28.
118. Although there is a high reported rate of compliance with ICSID awards, Peter Griffin &
Ania Farren, How ICSID Can Protect Sovereign Bondholders, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 2005, at 21, 24,
the awards issued to date tend to involve amounts that may pale in comparison to the stakes of
sovereign debt litigation, Franck, supra note 100, at 55–64.
119. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 12.
120. Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, Sovereign Debt 8–16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 5131, May 1995).
121. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 12; see also Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1632–38
(discussing growth of domestic debt in emerging markets). Not all defaults are strategic in this sense.
Default may be essentially involuntary in cases of significant economic distress or illiquidity. Yet for
these involuntary defaults, it seems doubtful that increased international pressure will lead to
substantial rates of voluntary payment. Presumably, the debtor is willing to pay, but financial exigency
limits its ability to do so.
122. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 18–23 (discussing sovereign debt restructuring and
need for creditor consent).
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Nor is it obvious that arbitration awards, even those issued by ICSID
panels, facilitate coercive debt collection. To be sure, under U.S. law foreign
states enjoy a more limited immunity from attachment and execution for
judgments based on arbitral awards.123 This is because the FSIA permits
successful arbitration claimants to execute upon property of a foreign state “used
for a commercial activity in the United States.”124 Successful court litigants, by
contrast, may execute upon such property only if the property also “is or was
used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based.”125 But this
benefit is largely illusory, for U.S. law also permits contractual waivers of
sovereign immunity.126 Thus, the issuer can confer this enforcement benefit
simply by agreeing to waive its immunity from execution. As it turns out, the
substantial majority of bond contracts in my sample contain such a waiver.127
The foregoing discussion has not exhausted arbitration’s potential
enforcement advantages. International treaties, including the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, require contracting
states to enforce arbitral awards with limited or no review of the merits of the
arbitration panel’s decision.128 Few such treaties require recognition and
enforcement of foreign court judgments.129 So it is conceivable that arbitration
awards might be easier to enforce than court judgments in the issuer’s own
courts.130 Yet in the context of default on hundreds of millions or billions of
dollars of national debt, it is unclear why these treaties would make much
difference. Perhaps the most fundamental problem is that the issuer’s courts will
lack the willingness or political capital necessary to induce the unwilling
sovereign to pay. Court judgments are not self-executing, so these courts can not
compel payment even if they wished to do so. And while issuers may incur
reputational costs by ignoring judgments rendered by their own courts, these

123. Compare Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (2006)
(no sovereign immunity from execution for property of foreign state used for commercial activity in
United States “if . . . the property is or was used [in connection with] . . . the commercial activity upon
which the claim is based” (emphasis added)), with id. § 1610(a)(6) (no sovereign immunity from
execution for property of foreign state used for commercial activity in United States if judgment “is
based on an order confirming an arbitral award”).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6).
125. Id. § 1610(a)(2).
126. Id. § 1610(a)(1).
127. See infra notes 190–202 and accompanying text for a discussion of bond contracts containing
a waiver of immunity.
128. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note
69, art. IV. For discussion of this treaty, which is often referred to as the New York Convention, and
other relevant treaties, see Park, supra note 81, at 219.
129. See Park, supra note 81, at 218 (noting some countries may enforce foreign judgments out of
desire for “comity,” but “not all legal systems will be so generous” (citations omitted)).
130. Because most of the issuer’s assets will be located within its jurisdiction, bondholders may
need to seek enforcement through these courts. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 10, at 11 (stating
“sovereign obligations cannot be directly enforced in the sovereign obligator’s own courts” and that
defaulting sovereigns rarely leave assets in countries with lowered sovereign immunity barriers).
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costs may not be very high.131 This fundamental dynamic persists even when the
issuer’s courts have the authority or duty to enforce an arbitration award.132 And
even if other jurisdictions exist in which foreign arbitration awards are
enforceable, but foreign court judgments are not, these jurisdictions do not
matter unless the issuer keeps substantial assets in them and the assets are
subject to execution under the enforcing jurisdiction’s law.133
None of this is to say that arbitration, before ICSID or any other
international arbitration tribunal, is inherently inferior for resolving sovereign
debt disputes. But its advantages are unclear, to say the least. Perhaps the most
we can say is that there is no justifiable consensus as to the best forum for
resolving sovereign debt disputes.134 Indeed, it may be that market actors have
given little thought to the question. Some evidence of this comes from the
behavior of public sector officials, who have devoted substantial attention to
identifying optimal contract terms for sovereign borrowing but have largely
ignored questions about the proper disputing forum.135 The important point,
however, is that arbitration’s benefits are not so apparent that many participants
in the sovereign debt markets are likely to favor it. And given the rather
speculative benefits arbitration offers, certainly they are not likely to have strong
preferences.

131. See Eric A. Posner, Book Review, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 509, 511 (2007) (reviewing ROBERT E.
SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006)) (noting potentially limited reputational costs of
ignoring national court judgments).
132. Cf. Cross, supra note 2, at 361 (acknowledging that this enforcement benefit may be only
“theoretical”).
133. There are currently 143 ICSID Contracting States, each of which is obliged to “recognize an
award . . . as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories
as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.” Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, supra note 99, art. 54(1). But ICSID does not
displace background law conferring immunity from execution on the sovereign’s assets. See id. art. 55
(specifying that “Article 54 shall not be construed as derogating from the law in force . . . relating to
immunity”). Thus, even “a final judgment of a court” in a jurisdiction in which the issuer keeps
substantial assets may be effectively unenforceable. Broad immunity waivers do not necessarily solve
this problem (even in jurisdictions that recognize them), because many sovereign assets will be exempt
from execution notwithstanding the waiver. See infra notes 196–99 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the effects of immunity waivers.
134. So much is clear from extant debates over the merits of U.S. class action practice. Compare
Whitney Debevoise & David Orta, The Class Action Threat to Sovereign Workouts, INT’L FIN. L. REV.,
July 2003, at 41, 44 (rejecting efficacy of class actions as response to sovereign debt in favor of
negotiated restructuring), with David Skeel, Why the Class Action Strategy Is Worth a Second Look,
INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 2003, at 23, 24 (arguing that, under current conditions, “there may be a role
for the class action mechanism to play”).
135. E.g., GROUP OF TEN, REPORT OF THE G-10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES 2–
5 (2002), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf (proposing model contract terms for
appointment of trustee or bondholder representative, majority action clauses, majority enforcement
and acceleration clauses, etc., without addressing disputing forum); see also Ahdieh, supra note 18, at
736–40 (discussing role of regulatory cues provided by public actors in spurring innovation).
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Evaluating Enforcement-Related Contracting Practices

The discussion thus far has taken for granted that sovereign bonds indeed
adopt boilerplate terms calling for litigation in New York or London, arguing
that there is no need to invoke network theory, or any other theory of contract
“stickiness,” to explain such a pattern. To the contrary, there is no reason to
presume that issuers or bondholders would be significantly better off choosing
arbitration. This section turns to the contracts themselves, asking whether the
assumption of standardization matches the empirical reality.
1.

Description of the Contracts

There is little empirical evidence on the use of arbitration in sovereign debt
contracts, and even less that would help explain why parties choose particular
enforcement-related terms. In a search of disclosure documents filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), Professor Karen Halverson
Cross found that only Brazilian bonds provided for arbitration.136 SEC filings,
however, cover only a portion of the sovereign debt market. In an effort to
develop a more robust picture of actual contracting practices, I randomly
selected and coded disclosure documents—offering circulars in the private
offering context, and prospectuses and prospectus supplements in the registered
offering context—gathered both from SEC filings and from the Thomson
Financial database.137 These disclosure documents contain detailed descriptions
of the terms of the underlying bond contracts.138
The dataset includes a total of 111 bond issuances between 1991 and 2008.
Most (96 out of 111) were issued between 1999 and 2007. New York or English
law governs 105 of the issuances. Because these two “standards” are of primary
interest, I have excluded the remaining six from the tables and figures reported
below.139 As Table 1 indicates, the resulting dataset includes 46 English-law
bonds, all of which are private issuances, and 59 New York-law bonds, of which
31 (52.5%) are private issuances and 28 (47.5%) are registered offerings.

136. Cross, supra note 2, at 340. Professor Cross also noted that some issuers located in the
former Eastern bloc were reputed to offer arbitration as an alternative to litigation. Id. at 340 & n.22
(citing Ukraine as example).
137. I thank Mitu Gulati for providing me with access to many of these disclosure documents.
138. Sovereign bond documentation includes a contract between the issuer and its investment
bankers, a disclosure statement, and contracts, “including the debt instrument itself, that govern the
relationship between the sovereign debtor and its bondholders.” Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at
1636. The issuer, its investment bankers, and their respective lawyers negotiate the “key contracts.” Id.
at 1637. Investors generally review only the disclosure statement, which describes key bond terms in
detail. See id. at 1637 n.43 (stating that, of the investors they interviewed, none reported reading
contract). For a general discussion of U.S. disclosure rules in the sovereign borrowing context, see
generally Lee C. Buchheit, The Schedule B Alternative, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July 1992, at 6, 6; Stephen
J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure Practices, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1023,
1034–43 (2005–2006).
139. These include two Canadian-law issuances by the Province of Manitoba, issuances governed
by French law by Morocco and Portugal, and German-law issuances by Argentina and Venezuela.
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Table 1. New York- and English-law bonds, by manner of issuance
Registered/Private
Private Registered Total
Governing Law

English
New York

46
31

0
28

46
59

Total

77

28

105

I coded each issuance for a variety of enforcement-related terms, including
approaches to sovereign immunity, choice of forum, use of arbitration, and
governing law. The resulting dataset offers the most comprehensive empirical
picture currently available of enforcement-related contracting practices in
sovereign debt transactions. SEC disclosures, for example, cover only bonds
publicly issued in U.S. markets, while this dataset allows an evaluation of
contracting practices in both public and private markets and with respect to
bonds governed by both New York and English law. Furthermore, the sample
includes at least one issuance from virtually every major issuer of New York or
English law bonds over a period of nearly twenty years.
As I have mentioned, actual contracting practices are difficult to
interpret.140 Assume, for example, that sovereign bonds uniformly eschew
arbitration for litigation. It may be impossible to identify the precise extent to
which such uniformity reflects the stickiness of the litigation default term, as
opposed to a widespread preference for litigation or some other cause.141 In
evaluating the data, however, I was particularly interested in contracting
practices that seemed inconsistent with any strong version of the stickiness story.
For example, variance in how different issuers structure the dispute resolution
process suggests that it may be easy to overstate the benefits that accrue from
widespread use of a particular dispute resolution term. In addition, a particular
kind of uniformity—widespread use of contract terms waiving the issuer’s
immunity from execution—would suggest an alternative explanation: Bonds that
include such clauses provide one of the primary enforcement benefits claimed
for arbitration142 without incurring any of the associated risks.143
I report several principal findings:
• First, across different issuers, bond contracts are not as standardized
140. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty in
interpreting actual contracting practices.
141. Cf. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 55, at 119 (“If the corporate form is advantageous for
some firms, the fact that firms are continuing to incorporate fails to indicate the presence of network
externalities.”).
142. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the enforcement benefits
of arbitration in light of bonds waiving the issuer’s immunity. See Cross, supra note 2, at 359 (noting
that immunity waivers may convey similar enforcement benefits but that not all sovereigns might
agree to such waiver).
143. See supra notes 80–135 and accompanying text for a discussion of the absence of associated
risks for bonds with immunity waivers.
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as is often supposed. With respect to choice of forum terms, this
variance includes, but is not limited to, a small minority of issuers
whose bonds permit investors to arbitrate.
• Second, issuers that agree to arbitration appear to have varied
reasons for doing so. Some are barred by domestic law from
submitting to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Others include
arbitration in a menu of disputing forums available at the investor’s
election. In most cases, however, the use of arbitration arguably is
driven by doubt as to the availability or efficacy of litigation in
foreign courts.
• Third, similarly situated issuers sometimes make different
contracting choices. For example, arbitration clauses are common
but not standard in bonds issued by former Soviet republics that are
relatively new entrants to the sovereign debt markets.
• Fourth, there is additional variance in sovereign immunity terms.
But a sizeable majority of the issuers (around eighty-five percent)
broadly waive their sovereign immunity from execution. The
widespread use of such immunity terms weakens the case for
arbitration’s superior enforceability.
• Finally, issuers with established dispute resolution terms rarely
change their contracting practices. Thus, despite the variance across
issuers, there is limited within-issuer variance.
The following sections discuss these findings. Part III discusses their
implications for sovereign debt arbitration and for research into contract
innovation and change.
2.

Variance Across Issuers: Choice of Forum and Arbitration

Unless otherwise noted, I report enforcement-related contracting practices
by issuer, reporting separate results for bonds issued under New York and
English law. That is, the figures reported below do not include multiple, samelaw bond issuances by the same issuer.144 However, in the few cases where I have
both New York- and English-law bonds by a particular issuer, I report separate
results for both sets of bonds.145 Beginning with choice of forum terms, the
disclosure documents reveal a perhaps surprising diversity of approaches. As
Table 2 indicates, most issuers submit to the jurisdiction of a single external
forum—courts in England (for English-law bonds) or New York (for New Yorklaw bonds)—and thus conform to one of the two perceived choice of forum

144. As I discuss below, see infra notes 204–06 and accompanying text, it appears that issuers
rarely change established contracting practices. Thus, excluding multiple issuances by the same issuer
avoids some double-counting without reducing the apparent diversity of contracting practices.
145. Only Poland, Kazakhstan, and the Philippines fall into this category. I report separate
results for the New York- and English-law bonds of these issuers because bonds are generally
considered to be standardized within (but not necessarily across) these two markets. See Ahdieh, supra
note 18, at 726 (noting New York and English debt markets are internally standardized but distinct
from each other).
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standards.146 But even a cursory glance at Table 2 reveals that the choice of
forum “standard” is not so standard after all. Indeed, over 20% of the issuers
depart in some way from the standard.147
Table 2. Summary of choice of forum terms

Choice of forum
No external forum
External forum

N
No submission to jurisdiction
Domestic courts only
Arbitration only
Arbitration + foreign courts
Multiple foreign courts
One foreign court

1
2
2
5
5
57
72

Issuers
% of
Cumulative
%
Total
1.4%
1.4%
2.8%
4.2%
2.8%
6.9%
6.9%
79.2%

6.9%
13.9%
20.8%
100.0%

One issuer (Russia) does not submit to any jurisdiction, even that of its own
courts.148 Two others (Australia and the Province of Nova Scotia) do not submit
to the jurisdiction of any foreign court or tribunal but do agree that bondholders
may sue in the borrower’s domestic courts.149 The remaining issuers submit to
the jurisdiction of some external forum, but often in ways that depart from the
choice of forum standard. Five issuers (6.9%) submit to the jurisdiction of both
New York and English courts.150 And, of course, some issuers add arbitration to
this mix.

146. Again, this does not mean that bondholders may only sue in these courts. In many cases, the
issuer also consents to be sued in its own courts. Moreover, the issuer may be amenable to suit in
foreign courts even if it has not agreed to be sued there, but if the issuer has not waived its immunity
from suit the bondholder would have to invoke exceptions to sovereign immunity under the law of
those jurisdictions. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text for a discussion of exceptions to
sovereign immunity.
147. The first five rows in Table 2 represent some departure from the choice of forum
“standards.”
148. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, OFFERING CIRCULAR 90 (June 10, 1998) (offering 11.75%
Bonds due in 2003 and specifying that “Issuer has not submitted to the jurisdiction of any court,
agreed that disputes may be resolved in any forum or appointed any agent for service of process”)
[hereinafter THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1998 OFFERING CIRCULAR]; THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
OFFERING CIRCULAR 85–86 (June 26, 1997) (offering 10% Bonds due in 2007) [hereinafter THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1997 OFFERING CIRCULAR].
149. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER
SCHEDULE B OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, at 9–10 (June 5, 1995); PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA
(CAN.), PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS DATED JUNE 6, 2002) 5 (Jan. 18, 2007).
150. Two of these are New York-law bonds (Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago) and three are
English-law bonds (Oman, Moldova, Barbados).
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As it turns out, the prevailing view that sovereign bond contracts eschew
the use of arbitration is correct, but only to a point.151 Bonds issued by seven of
the seventy-two issuers (9.7%) expressly permit bondholders to bring claims in
arbitration: Brazil, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, the Slovak Republic,
and Ukraine.152 As Table 3 indicates, five of these are English-law bonds (all
private issuances) and two are New York-law bonds (one a private issuance and
one registered).153
Table 3. Arbitration use by governing law and manner of issuance

Registered/Private
Private

Arbitration

Registered

Arbitration

No
Yes
No
Yes
Total

Governing Law
English New York Total
26
21
47
5
1
6
0
18
18
0
1
1
31
41
72

Although only a minority of issuers use arbitration, Table 4 below reveals
some interesting differences in how and why they use it. National law in both
Brazil and El Salvador forbids each country to submit to the jurisdiction of
foreign courts.154 The New York-law bonds issued by these countries
contemplate only arbitration in New York or litigation in the borrower’s
domestic courts. Each, therefore, represents a significant departure from the
151. See Cross, supra note 2, at 377 (referring to “persistent absence” of arbitration from
sovereign bond contracts); Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 (discussing lack of arbitration clauses in
sovereign bonds).
152. I say “expressly permit,” because including an arbitration clause in the bond contract is not
the only way sovereign issuers may consent to arbitration. Many bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”)
contain provisions allowing foreign investors to submit investment-related disputes to arbitration,
often before ICSID. See, e.g., Memorandum from Owen C. Pell to the Global Committee of Argentina
Bondholders, supra note 56 (stating one benefit of ICSID is that while U.S. judgments are not
automatically respected outside the U.S., Argentina is obligated to honor ICSID awards). For
example, relying on a provision in the Italy-Argentina BIT, Italian bondholders have instituted ICSID
arbitration proceedings against Argentina. See Alemanni v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/8 (registered Mar. 27, 2007); Beccara v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5
(registered Feb. 7, 2007).
153. In one case (Poland), five of the seven English-law bonds in the sample include an
arbitration clause, and two do not. In all other cases where I have multiple issuances of same-law
bonds (Brazil (2); El Salvador (8); Slovakia (2); Ukraine (4)), all bonds in the sample contain an
arbitration clause.
154. See, e.g., FEDERATIVE REP. OF BRAZ., FINAL PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS
DATED MAY 8, 2007) 13 (Jan. 6, 2009) (“Brazil is prohibited from submitting to the jurisdiction of a
foreign court for the purposes of adjudication on the merits.”); THE REP. OF EL SAL., OFFERING
CIRCULAR v (Oct. 17, 2002) (offering 7.75% Notes due in 2023 and stating that “[u]nder its
Constitution, the Republic is not permitted to consent to jurisdiction of the courts of any foreign
jurisdiction”).
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standard. The arbitration clause effectively substitutes for foreign court
litigation, perhaps as a concession to investors reluctant to submit to the
jurisdiction of the issuer’s domestic courts. And in each case, domestic law
prevents the issuer from agreeing to the “standard” term.
By contrast, bonds issued by Georgia, Estonia, Poland, the Slovak Republic,
and Ukraine (all governed by English law) supplement the standard dispute
resolution term with an additional forum choice, arbitration, to be invoked at the
bondholder’s discretion. Consider a sample clause as described in the offering
circular to a 2002 issuance by the Republic of Estonia:
(2) Jurisdiction of English Courts
The Issuer irrevocably agrees . . . that the courts of England are to have
jurisdiction to settle any disputes which may arise out of or in
connection with the Notes or the Coupons . . . . Nothing in this
Condition shall limit any right to take Proceedings against the Issuer in
any other court of competent jurisdiction . . . .
(3) Arbitration
The Issuer also agrees that any disputes . . . may, at the option of the
relevant holder, be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration under
the Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration . . . . The
place of any such arbitration shall be London and the language
English.155
In this clause, arbitration does not substitute for the issuer’s consent to be
sued in foreign courts. Rather, arbitration adds to a menu of disputing options,
effectively permitting investors to select the forum that will maximize the
likelihood of enforcement.
Table 4. Arbitration users; submission to other external forums
Issuer
Brazil
El Salvador
Estonia
Georgia
Poland
Slovak Republic
Ukraine

Governing Law
New York
New York
English
English
English
English
English

Other External
None
None
Courts of England
Courts of England
Courts of England
Courts of England
Courts of England

Despite these apparent differences, there may be a common theme linking
many of these issuers: in each case, there may be greater-than-usual uncertainty
as to whether the issuer’s courts will enforce foreign court judgments. In such
cases, investors may assign greater value to arbitration’s ordinarily rather
speculative enforcement advantages. For Brazil and El Salvador, the refusal to

155.

REP. OF EST., OFFERING CIRCULAR 9 (June 25, 2002) (offering 5% Notes due in 2007).
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submit to foreign jurisdiction, or to waive immunity from suit or execution, limits
the value of litigation in foreign courts.156 Georgia, Estonia, Ukraine, and the
Slovak Republic are relatively new issuers of sovereign debt, each having gained
its independence in the early 1990s.157 Each of these issuers of English-law
bonds, moreover, gained its independence from a country whose law of
sovereign immunity may have offered absolute immunity from suit and
execution.158 And although each agrees to a broad immunity waiver, their
domestic law may deny enforcement to foreign court judgments.159 For example,
although members of the European Union recognize judgments rendered by the
courts of other EU member states,160 Georgia and Ukraine are not EU

156. Bondholders might successfully invoke the jurisdiction of foreign courts even without the
issuer’s consent. Under U.S. law, for example, foreign states are not immune from suit (as opposed to
execution) in actions based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006). See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the commercial activities exception to sovereign immunity. U.S. law, however, requires a separate
waiver of immunity from execution, which neither country provides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1)
(stating foreign property in United States is not immune from attachment following adverse judgment
if “the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment . . . either explicitly or by implication”).
And judgments obtained in foreign courts without the issuer’s consent to jurisdiction may not be
enforceable in the issuer’s own courts. See, e.g., FEDERATIVE REP. OF BRAZ., supra note 154, at 13
(“Any judgment rendered against Brazil by a court outside Brazil in an action in which Brazil has not
submitted to the jurisdiction of such court or otherwise expressly waived its defense of sovereign
immunity would not be enforceable against Brazil under its laws.”).
157. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Estonia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/
5377.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009) (stating independence established from U.S.S.R. in 1991); U.S.
Dep’t of State, Background Note: Georgia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5253.htm (last visited Dec.
2, 2009) (stating independence obtained in 1991); U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Slovakia,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3430.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009) (noting independence gained in
1993); U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Ukraine, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3211.htm (last
visited Dec. 2, 2009) (stating independence gained in 1991).
158. See FOX, supra note 8, at 230–31 (describing sovereign immunity law in former
Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union, and in Russian Federation). Moreover, the former Soviet Union,
from which Georgia, Estonia, and Ukraine gained independence, apparently had no domestic law
permitting officials to waive the state’s sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Mark A. Stoleson, Note,
Investment at an Impasse: Russia’s Production-Sharing Agreement Law and the Continuing Barriers to
Petroleum Investment in Russia, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 671, 686 (1997) (discussing how proposal
for new law would allow Russia to waive sovereign immunity in contracts with foreign investors). The
Georgian, Estonian, and Ukrainian bonds, however, all contain broad immunity waivers.
159. See UKR., OFFERING CIRCULAR 12 (Jan. 29, 2007) (offering 3.5% Notes due in 2018 and
specifying that “[c]ourts in Ukraine will not enforce a judgment obtained in a court established in a
country other than Ukraine unless such enforcement is envisaged by an international treaty . . . or an
ad hoc arrangement between such country and Ukraine providing for reciprocal enforcement of
judgments . . . [T]here is no such treaty or arrangement in effect between Ukraine and Ireland,
Switzerland or the United Kingdom. An arbitration award would, however, generally be enforceable
in Ukraine . . . .”); REP. OF EST., supra note 155, at 42 (similar provision); GEOR., PRELIMINARY
PROSPECTUS 4 (Mar. 28, 2008) (similar provision); THE SLOVAK REP., OFFERING CIRCULAR 60 (June
21, 1999) (offering 7.5% Notes due in 2004 and containing similar provision). To the extent these
issuers keep assets in other countries, however, the immunity waiver may increase bondholders’ odds
of successful execution.
160. Joseph J. Simeone, The Recognition and Enforceability of Foreign Country Judgments, 37
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 341, 362 (1993).
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members, nor were Estonia or the Slovak Republic at the time each issued the
bonds in my sample.161
Initially, then, it appears that issuers include arbitration clauses in their
bonds primarily when there are particular reasons to doubt the enforceability of
foreign court judgments. But this explanation may fail to account for the full
variance in the use of arbitration clauses. Poland, for example, acceded to the
Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters in 1999, thus obliging itself to enforce judgments issued by
EU member states.162 Yet English-law bonds issued in 2002 permit bondholders
to choose between arbitration and litigation in English courts.163 Moreover,
arbitration clauses are sometimes absent even when there may be increased
doubt about the enforceability of foreign court judgments. For example, Englishlaw bonds issued by Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Lithuania (which are former Soviet
republics like Georgia, Estonia, and Ukraine) confer nonexclusive jurisdiction
on English courts but do not consent to arbitration.164 English-law bonds issued
by Moldova, another former Soviet republic, submit to the jurisdiction of courts
in England and New York but do not agree to arbitration in either.165 Yet at
least some of these issuers appear to pose enforcement problems similar to those
posed by the arbitration users.166

161. Professor Cross notes: “The reason for allowing the lenders the option of arbitration is that
Ukraine, similar to other sovereign issuers located in the former Eastern bloc, is not an EU member
and therefore is not obligated to recognize court judgments rendered in EU member states.” Cross,
supra note 2, at 340 n.22 (citing Andrew Yianni, partner, Clifford Chance, e-mail correspondence to
author dated Nov. 26, 2007, 8:34 am CST (on file with author)). Estonia and Slovakia joined the EU in
2004, while the latest bonds in my sample were issued in 2002 (Estonia) and 2003 (Slovakia). Europa,
The 2004 Enlargement: The Challenge of a 25-Member EU, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
enlargement/2004_and_2007_enlargement/e50017_en.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).
162. Pawel Pietkiewicz & Łukasz Hejmej, The Polish Judicial System and Legal Procedure, in
POLISH BUSINESS LAW, 43, 59 & n.134 (Zdzislaw Brodecki ed., 2003).
163. See, e.g., THE REP. OF POL., OFFERING CIRCULAR 11–12 (Mar. 8, 2002) (offering 5.5%
Notes due in 2012 and providing terms for arbitration and court jurisdiction).
164. See REP. OF KAZ., OFFERING CIRCULAR 14 (May 10, 2000) (offering 11.125% Notes due in
2007 and detailing terms under which jurisdiction is applicable); REP. OF LAT., OFFERING CIRCULAR 10–
11 (Apr. 1, 2004) (offering 4.25% Notes due in 2014 and setting forth governing law and jurisdiction for
notes and coupons); THE REP. OF LITH., OFFERING CIRCULAR 9 (May 8, 2002) (offering 5.875% Notes
due in 2012 and stating governing law regarding notes and coupons).
165. See THE REP. OF MOLD., INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 17 (Dec. 5, 2002) (offering
39,865,000 U.S. Dollar Denominated Notes due in 2009 and detailing governing law and jurisdiction).
Of these four countries (Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova), only Latvia and Lithuania are
EU members. Europa, supra note 161. All four are parties to the New York Arbitration Convention.
See U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, STATUS TABLE FOR CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS 1–2, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/
Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXII/XXII-1.en.pdf.
166. For example, disclosure documents indicate that courts in Kazakhstan will not enforce
foreign judgments unless a treaty between Kazakhstan and the country in which the judgment was
rendered provides for reciprocal enforcement, but “[t]here is no such treaty in effect between
Kazakhstan and the United Kingdom or between Kazakhstan and the United States.” REP. OF KAZ.,
supra note 164, at 6. Disclosure documents for Moldovan bonds contain a similar caution. See THE
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Thus, while it is tempting to attribute arbitration usage to unique concerns
over the enforceability of foreign court judgments, questions remain. What is
clear is that a number of issuers have issued bonds that include arbitration
clauses, and that these are only some of the departures from the choice of forum
standard.167 Moreover, there is additional variance across issuers in sovereign
immunity provisions. The next section discusses these sovereign immunity
findings.
3.

Variance Across Issuers: Sovereign Immunity Terms

Previously, I noted that the standard set of enforcement terms also contains
a waiver of the sovereign’s immunity from suit and perhaps execution.168 But it
may be misleading to refer to a “standard” set of terms. The immunity waivers
negotiated by different issuers vary to a surprising degree.169 The bond contracts
approach immunity in one of three ways: some refuse to waive immunity
altogether; some waive immunity from suit but not immunity from attachment
and execution; and some waive both forms of immunity, though typically with
exceptions for property used for public or governmental purposes. Most issuers,
however, fall into the third category, waiving immunity both from suit and from
execution. These issuers use sovereign immunity terms to confer on bondholders
one of the key enforcement advantages claimed for arbitration.
a.

No Waiver of Immunity (at Least in Foreign Courts)

Five issuers of New York- or English-law bonds do not waive sovereign
immunity from either jurisdiction or execution, at least in foreign courts.170 For
example, offering circulars describing Russian bonds caution:
The Issuer has not waived any rights to sovereign immunity it may
have in any jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Issuer may be entitled to
immunity from suit in any action or proceeding arising out of the
Bonds and the Issuer and its assets, properties and revenues may be
entitled to immunity in any enforcement action. In addition, the Issuer
has not submitted to the jurisdiction of any court, agreed that disputes
may be resolved in any forum or appointed any agent for service of

REP. OF MOLD., supra note 165, at 4 (citing lack of international treaty between Moldova and United
States and Moldova and United Kingdom regarding enforcement of civil case judgments).
167. See supra notes 146–50 and Table 2 for a discussion of choice of forum.
168. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text for a discussion of sovereign immunity
waivers. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 142 (noting that conventional waiver of immunity covers
both sovereign’s immunity from suit and immunity of its property from attachment or execution).
169. This variance may be driven in part by differences in issuers’ domestic laws pertaining to
sovereign immunity. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 143 (discussing variance in domestic laws and
potential impact on sovereign immunity).
170. These are Australia (New York-law bonds issued in 1995), Brazil (New York-law bonds
issued in 1999 and 2007), El Salvador (New York-law bonds issued in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, and
2006), Nova Scotia (New York-law bonds issued in 2007), and Russia (English-law bonds issued in
1997 and 1998). Two additional issuances—Canadian-law bonds issued by the Province of Manitoba in
2003 and 2007—also fall into this category.
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process. . . . Accordingly, Bondholders may have difficulty obtaining
effective redress in connection with the Issuer’s obligations under the
Bonds.171
In the case of the Russian Federation, domestic law may not authorize
officials to waive sovereign immunity.172 However, issuers with significant
negotiating leverage, obvious reputation for repayment, robust and effective
legal systems, or some combination of these factors also may decline to waive
sovereign immunity or agree only to litigation in their domestic courts. For
example, disclosures for New York-law bonds issued by the Province of Nova
Scotia indicate that the Province has not waived its immunity from jurisdiction
but “does not have immunity in the courts of Nova Scotia from lawsuits based on
the securities.”173 A bondholder who obtains a judgment from a court in Nova
Scotia may be unable to enforce it by execution, but “must be paid by the
Minister of Finance out of the Consolidated Fund of the Province.”174 The
Province thus seeks to channel litigation into domestic courts and contemplates
voluntary payment of any resulting judgment, rather than enforcement through
execution.175
In similar fashion, Brazil discloses in a 2007 prospectus that it has made only
a limited waiver of its jurisdictional immunity, consenting to jurisdiction in the
Southern District of New York solely for the purpose of converting an
arbitration award into a judgment.176 Brazil does not waive its immunity from
suit in foreign courts for any other purpose, nor does it waive its immunity from
execution with respect to property located outside Brazil.177 Successful
171. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1998 OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 148, at 89–90; THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1997 OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 148, at 85–86.
172. At least until recently, domestic law in the Russian Federation did not permit officials to
waive sovereign immunity. Stoleson, supra note 158, at 686. As of November 2001, the Federation had
yet to pass legislation weakening the former rule providing for absolute sovereign immunity. FOX,
supra note 8, at 126.
173. PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA (CAN.), supra note 149, at 5. Canadian-law bonds issued by the
Province of Manitoba contain similar provisions. See PROVINCE OF MANITOBA (CAN.), PROSPECTUS
SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS DATED NOV. 4, 2003) 7 (Apr. 5, 2005) (offering 4.45% Debentures due
in 2010 and noting province “does not have immunity in the courts of Manitoba from lawsuits based
on the Securities”).
174. PROVINCE OF NOVA SCOTIA (CAN.), supra note 149, at 5.
175. The lack of a contract term submitting to the jurisdiction of foreign courts does not
necessarily prevent the issuer from being sued there. It does, however, make it more difficult for
bondholders to obtain and enforce a foreign judgment. See infra notes 180–83 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the difficulty in enforcing a foreign judgment in the absence of certain contract
terms.
176. FEDERATIVE REP. OF BRAZ., supra note 154, at 13.
177. Id. Brazil consents to jurisdiction in New York “for the limited purpose of converting into a
judgment an arbitral award rendered against Brazil in New York.” Id.; see also Cross, supra note 2,
app. I, at 378–79 (setting out terms of Fiscal Agency Agreement, in which Brazil agrees not to raise
any immunity defenses “in any arbitration proceedings or judicial proceedings for the conversion of
any award rendered in arbitration . . . into a judgment” (emphasis added)). Note that proceedings to
convert an arbitration award into a judgment are not the same as proceedings to enforce the judgment
itself—for example, by seizing and selling sovereign assets. A separate waiver of immunity of
execution would be required for such proceedings, and Brazil appears not to provide such a waiver.
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arbitration claimants must obtain a Brazilian court order recognizing the
arbitration award, after which Brazilian law, at the time of the issuance, required
that the award be included for payment in a subsequent budget.178 For actions
brought in Brazilian courts, however, the bonds waive immunity from
jurisdiction and execution in Brazil (except for execution on public property).179
The fact that an issuer refuses to waive immunity from suit or execution
does not mean that bondholders cannot sue in foreign courts. Under the FSIA,
for example, foreign states do not enjoy immunity from suit in actions based on
“commercial activity” that takes place within, or that has a sufficient connection
to, the United States.180 The issuance of sovereign bonds constitutes commercial
activity under the FSIA.181 A contractual waiver of immunity, however, can
eliminate any threshold jurisdictional issues182 and make a broader range of
property subject to execution.183 But as the examples in this section illustrate,
although investors presumably value such waivers, not all sovereign issuers
provide them.
b.

Waiver of Jurisdictional Immunity Only

Bonds by another four issuers appear to waive immunity from suit in
foreign courts, but not immunity from execution against state property.184 South
African bonds issued in 2006 are one example:
The South African government will irrevocably submit to the
jurisdiction of the Federal and State courts in The City of New York,
and will irrevocably waive any immunity from the jurisdiction
(including sovereign immunity but not any immunity from execution or
attachment or process in the nature thereof) of such courts and any
objection to venue, in connection with any action arising out of or
based upon the Notes brought by any holder of Notes.185

178. FEDERATIVE REP. OF BRAZ., supra note 154, at 13–14.
179. Id. at 14.
180. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006) (stating that foreign state has no immunity from suit in
actions based upon “a commercial activity carried on in the United States,” or “an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere,” or “an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity . . . and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States”).
181. Rep. of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614–15 (1992).
182. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 141 (noting this benefit of contractual immunity waivers).
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (stating that foreign state is not immune from suit when it has
waived immunity); id. § 1610(a)(1) (providing that property in United States used for commercial
activity is subject to execution if foreign state has waived immunity from execution, even if property is
not or was not used for commercial activity upon which claim was based, as 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2)
would otherwise require).
184. The four issuers are China (New York-law bonds issued in 2003), Finland (New York-law
bonds issued in 1996), Italy (New York-law bonds issued in 2004), and South Africa (New York-law
bonds issued in 2006).
185. REP. OF S. AFR., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS DATED AUG. 20, 2003) S-2 to
S-3 (Apr. 18, 2006) (offering 4.5% Notes due in 2016). As with many other issuers, South Africa
reserves the right to plead sovereign immunity with respect to claims under U.S. federal or state
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In jurisdictions that recognize the so-called restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, like the United States and United Kingdom, such contract terms
defeat threshold jurisdictional objections.186 But without a separate waiver of
immunity from execution, creditors may have greater difficulty seizing property
located in these jurisdictions.187 For example, it is likely that holders of these
South African bonds could execute against property used for a commercial
activity within the United States only if the property “is or was used for the
commercial activity upon which the [bondholders’] claim is based.”188 As an
alternative, bondholders may file suit in South African courts, and they may also
seek to enforce foreign judgments in South Africa. In either case, however,
South African law may not permit execution against state property. Rather, the
State Liability Act currently requires any judgments to be paid out of the
National Revenue Fund.189
c.

Waiver of Immunity from Jurisdiction and Execution

The most common category of sovereign immunity waiver extends to both
jurisdiction and execution.190 Sixty-three of the seventy-two issuers (87.5%) in
the sample agreed to such a waiver. Note that these clauses effectively provide
one of the primary enforcement benefits claimed for arbitration.191 That is, they
permit bondholders who obtain court judgments to execute upon property of a
foreign state “used for a commercial activity in the United States” without
demonstrating any nexus to the “commercial activity upon which the claim is
based.”192 They may also facilitate enforcement in other jurisdictions where such
waivers are recognized.
securities laws. Id. at S-3; see also Choi & Gulati, supra note 138, at 1035–36 n.44 (discussing import of
issuer’s refusal to waive immunity with respect to securities law claims).
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (stating immunity can be waived implicitly or explicitly); FOX,
supra note 8, at 146 (noting that State Immunity Act of 1978 allows prior written agreements which
bind state in advance to court jurisdiction).
187. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (providing commercial activity exception to immunity from
execution); FOX, supra note 8, at 146 (providing that, under State Immunity Act of 1978, general
immunity waiver does not imply immunity waiver for execution of judgment).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). The requirement that there be a nexus between the commercial
property located in the United States and the “commercial activity upon which the claim is based” is
absent where the sovereign has waived immunity from execution. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1).
189. REP. OF S. AFR., supra note 184, at S-32. For a discussion of current developments regarding
the State Liability Act, including whether creditors may in fact be able to execute upon or attach state
assets, see generally SHAMEELA SEEDAT, INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA, NONCOMPLIANCE BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS WITH COURT ORDERS: WILL SECTION 3 OF THE
STATE LIABILITY ACT BE STRUCK DOWN BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT? (2007), available at
http://www.idasa.org.za/gbOutputFiles.asp?WriteContent=Y&RID=1981.
190. In some cases, the issuer’s domestic law may bar execution on sovereign property located
within its own jurisdiction, but the issuer still waives its immunity from execution for assets located
elsewhere. I include these bonds in this category.
191. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text for a discussion of foreign states’ more
limited immunity from attachment and execution under U.S. law.
192. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (declaring property not immune from execution if it “is or
was used for commercial activity upon which the claim is based”), with id. § 1610(a)(6) (declaring
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Consider a fairly typical clause from the Republic of Hungary:
To the extent that the Republic may in any jurisdiction claim for itself
or its assets or its revenues immunity from suit, execution, attachment
. . . the Republic agrees not to claim and irrevocably waives such
immunity to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of such
jurisdiction, provided that the Republic does not waive any immunity
with respect to: (i) present or future “premises of the mission” as
defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations signed in
1961, (ii) “consular premises” as defined in the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations signed in 1963, (iii) any other property or assets
used solely for official state purposes in the Republic of Hungary or
elsewhere, or (iv) military property or assets of the Republic of
Hungary related thereto.193
This clause exempts from execution property used for diplomatic or
military, or for “public” or “governmental,” as opposed to commercial, purposes.
These exemptions serve an obvious function: “If a foreign bank were to attempt
to levy against the Presidential Palace or the state orphanage, for example, this
would almost certainly prompt a phone call to the unfortunate lawyer who
negotiated the loan agreement on behalf of the sovereign borrower.”194
Even the issuers who waive immunity from suit and execution, however,
vary in the extent to which they expressly exempt property from execution. For
example, some do not exempt noncommercial property from execution. Contrast
the preceding clause with the following extraordinarily broad waiver of
sovereign immunity described in a 2002 offering circular from Estonia:
The Issuer hereby irrevocably and unconditionally waives and agrees
not to raise . . . any right to claim sovereign, diplomatic or other
immunity from jurisdiction or execution and any similar defence, and
irrevocably and unconditionally consents to the giving of any relief or
the issue of any process, including, without limitation, the making,
enforcement or execution against any property whatsoever (irrespective
of its use or intended use) ..... 195
What are the implications of this extraordinarily broad language? For example,
has Estonia waived immunity from execution for its embassies in London and
Washington, D.C.?
In all likelihood, the answer is that this broad language is functionally
similar, if not identical, to the much more cautiously worded waiver provision in
the Hungarian bonds. Diplomatic property is immune from execution under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, notwithstanding the sovereign’s

property not immune from execution if judgment is “based on an order confirming an arbitral award
rendered against the foreign state, provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would
not be inconsistent with any provision in the arbitral agreement”). See supra notes 123–26 and
accompanying text for a discussion of differences between arbitration and litigation in the scope of a
foreign state’s immunity from attachment and execution.
193. REP. OF HUNG., OFFERING CIRCULAR 11 (Feb. 5, 2003) (offering 4.5% Notes due in 2013).
194. BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 143.
195. REP. OF EST., supra note 155, at 9 (emphasis added).
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advance waiver of immunity.196 Under U.S. law, moreover, the FSIA recognizes
such waivers only with respect to property “used for a commercial activity in the
United States.”197 Property used or intended to be used in connection with a
military activity is likewise exempt from execution whether or not the sovereign
has waived immunity in advance.198 These and other limitations highlight the
general difficulty bondholders have enforcing judgments against defaulting
issuers—a difficulty that remains whether the issuer agrees to arbitration, waives
its sovereign immunity, or both.199
Despite these reasons for doubting the practical significance of Estonia’s
broad waiver, other issuers with similarly broad waivers of immunity do carve
out specific exemptions for diplomatic, consular, and military property. Thus,
English-law bonds issued by Latvia in 2004 expressly exempt diplomatic,
consular, and military property from execution.200 Even these bonds, however,
omit the express exemption, found in the Hungarian bonds, for “official” or
“public” property located in the sovereign’s own territory or elsewhere.201
196. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22, done Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95; EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: A COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 129 (1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(4)(B) (stating that exception to
immunity from execution for judgments establishing rights in property does not apply to property
“used for purposes of maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission or the residence of the Chief of
such mission”); S&S Mach. Co. v. Masinexportimport, 802 F. Supp. 1109, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(denying judgment creditor’s request for attachment of Romanian consulate building notwithstanding
Romanian government’s waiver, by treaty, of immunity).
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (listing limited exceptions under which commercial property of
foreign states located within the United States can be attached); Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Rep. of
Liber., 659 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting two-step analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) that
requires foreign states to waive immunity and use attached property for commercial activity). An
arbitration award confers no advantage here; holders of such awards may only execute on property
“used for a commercial activity in the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6).
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2) (stating that, regardless of whether there has been waiver of
immunity sufficient under § 1610, property is immune from execution if it is, or “is intended to be,
used in connection with a military activity and is . . . [either] of a military character, or . . . is under the
control of a military authority or defense agency”).
199. Conceivably, the broad waiver might have greater force in other jurisdictions in which
Estonia keeps significant assets, including within Estonia itself, but that prospect seems speculative at
best. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261, for example, does not expressly extend to consular premises the same immunity from execution
extended to diplomatic premises by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. See S&S Mach.
Co., 802 F. Supp. at 1111 n.5. Perhaps Estonia’s failure to exempt consular property from its waiver of
immunity from execution would strengthen a creditor’s hand in seeking to execute on such property.
But the prospect of successful enforcement proceedings still seems remote. See id. (denying
attachment of consular property). See generally August Reinisch, European Court Practice Concerning
State Immunity from Enforcement Measures, 17 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 803 (2006) (describing approaches
to enforcement immunity in number of European countries, including general recognition of immunity
for property serving sovereign or governmental purposes).
200. REP. OF LAT., supra note 164, at 11. For a similar waiver provision, see THE REP. OF LITH.,
supra note 163, at 9.
201. See supra note 193 and accompanying text for a Hungarian offering circular that exempts
property “used solely for official state purposes” from immunity. See KINGDOM OF MOROCCO,
OFFERING CIRCULAR 7 (July 7, 2003) (offering 5% Notes due in 2008 and exempting “property
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Thus, there remain differences in the immunity provisions even among
issuers who generally waive immunity from both suit and execution. These
differences may be of modest practical significance and in some cases may reflect
variance among issuers’ domestic laws related to sovereign immunity.202
Nevertheless, it is curious that the disclosure documents would contain such
variation. Some issuers, moreover, quite clearly negotiate substantively
meaningful changes to the standard broad waiver of sovereign immunity.
Russia’s refusal to waive sovereign immunity from suit or jurisdiction is an
example.203 Across issuers, then, it is perhaps misleading to describe the dispute
resolution provisions in sovereign bonds as “boilerplate.”
4.

Limited Variance Within Issuers

Nevertheless, if enforcement-related terms vary across issuers, individual
issuers do not often change the terms they have adopted. I have multiple sets of
disclosure documents for only sixteen issuers, averaging 3.2 disclosure
documents for each of these sixteen. Thus, despite the breadth of the dataset, it
is not especially “deep,” and the conclusions in this section are somewhat
tentative.
With that caveat, however, the issuers in the current sample rarely
introduce significant changes to their established enforcement-related
contracting practices. With the exception of Poland, the issuers in my sample do
not vary the choice of forum or sovereign immunity terms across different samelaw issuances.204 Focusing on a subset of issuers, Table 5 represents the relative

located in Morocco dedicated to a public or governmental use (as opposed to a commercial use) by the
Kingdom”).
202. For example, sovereign borrowers whose domestic law does not forbid execution on
property used for public or governmental purposes may include express exemptions for such property.
BUCHHEIT, supra note 20, at 143.
203. See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text for further discussion of Russian bonds.
204. This is true for same-law issuances. For example, if its New York-law bonds provide for
litigation in New York, and the issuer subsequently issues English-law bonds providing for litigation in
England, I do not consider this a change in bond terms. It is, rather, the issuance of bonds that
conform to the alternate standard. Compare REP. OF THE PHIL., OFFERING CIRCULAR 16 (Sept. 5,
2002) (offering 7.5% Bonds due in 2007 and providing for litigation in English courts), with REP. OF
THE PHIL., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT FOR 6.375% GLOBAL BONDS DUE 2032 (Jan. 9, 2007) (registered
New York-law bonds; litigation in New York courts).
In addition to the exception referenced in the text, there is one other possible exception: South
Africa. The prospectus supplement for a 2006 registered offering of New York-law bonds makes clear
that South Africa has not waived its immunity from execution. REP. OF S. AFR., supra note 185, at S-3.
No such limitation appears in the prospectus supplement for a similar 2007 issuance, which states only
that South Africa has not waived its immunity for claims based on U.S. securities laws. REP. OF S.
AFR., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT (TO PROSPECTUS, DATED AUG. 20, 2003) S-11 (May 16, 2007)
(offering 5.875% Notes due in 2022). And the underlying prospectus states that South Africa “will
irrevocably waive any immunity to which it might otherwise be entitled” and thus implies a broader
waiver of sovereign immunity. REP. OF S. AFR., PROSPECTUS 8–9 (Aug. 20, 2003) (offering debt
securities and warrants to purchase debt securities). Both the 2006 and 2007 bonds, however, were
issued pursuant to an Amended and Restated Fiscal Agency Agreement between South Africa and
Deutsche Bank, to which the form of the bond is attached. And the bond itself states that South Africa
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continuity of enforcement-related bond terms over time (with changes marked
by the symbol “•”). Note that bond terms may remain unchanged despite
changes in the law firms representing the issuer or underwriters.205 Note, too,
that different issuers may adopt different enforcement-related terms even
though the same law firms are involved.206

does not waive its “immunity from execution or attachment or process in the nature thereof.” Form of
Registered Security, Attached as Exhibit A to Amended and Restated Fiscal Agency Agreement,
dated as of May 15, 2003 between Rep. of South Africa and Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas. Thus,
it appears that in each case the issuer waives only its immunity from jurisdiction.
205. For example, Table 5 shows that El Salvador’s enforcement-related terms remain
unchanged despite the switch from Brown & Wood to Arnold & Porter as counsel to the issuer, and
the switch from Rogers & Wells to Cleary Gottlieb as counsel to the underwriter. Likewise, Ukraine’s
enforcement terms remain unchanged despite transitions from White & Case to Linklaters as issuer’s
counsel and from Allen & Overy to Clifford Chance as underwriters’ counsel.
206. White & Case, for example, represented both Costa Rica (2003) and Ukraine (2000, 2002).
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Table 5. Within-issuer standardization
Issuer

Year

Argentina

1994

Issuer
Counsel
Cleary
Gottlieb

Underwriter
Counsel

Choice
of Law

Choice of
Forum

Davis Polk

NY

NY courts

Immunity
Provision
Jurisdiction and
execution

1998
2000
Sullivan &
Cromwell

2001
Costa
Rica

Greenberg
Traurig
White &
Case

Cleary
Gottlieb

NY

NY courts

Jurisdiction and
execution

Brown &
Wood

Rogers &
Wells

NY

Arbitration or
domestic
courts

Jurisdiction and
execution in
domestic courts
only

Arnold &
Porter

Cleary
Gottlieb

Gov’t
lawyer

Linklaters

English

Courts of
England

Jurisdiction and
execution

White &
Case

Allen &
Overy

English

Arbitration or
courts of
England

Jurisdiction and
execution

Linklaters

Clifford
Chance

1995

White &
Case

Linklaters

2000

Allen &
Overy

Clifford
Chance

2001
2003

El
Salvador

1999
2000
2001
2002
2002
2002
2005
2006

Lithuania

2000
2002
2006

Ukraine

2000
2002
2005
2007

Poland

English

Courts of
England
• Arbitration
or courts of
England

Jurisdiction and
execution

2002
2002
2003
2004
2008

• Courts of
England

As Table 5 shows for that subset of issuers, enforcement-related bond terms
do not often change. The exception is Poland, which apparently issued Englishlaw bonds in 1995 that provided for litigation in English courts, added an
arbitration clause to bonds issued between 2000 and 2004, and removed the
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arbitration clause from bonds issued in 2008. A second exception (not noted in
Table 5) involves a minor change, but one that usefully highlights the role law
firms may play in designing and disseminating new contract terms. Although all
of the El Salvadoran bonds in my sample provide for arbitration in New York
under rules developed by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, the arbitration provision changed between 2000 and 2001.207 The
2001 bonds specify the number of arbitrators (three) and the method of their
selection, contain provisions addressing the nationality of the third arbitrator,
and explicitly state that claims under U.S. securities laws are not subject to
arbitration.208 The arbitration clause in the 2000 bonds does not address these
issues.209
Apparently, the law firm representing the issuer is responsible for this
change to the El Salvadoran bonds. Prior to 2001, El Salvador was represented
by Brown & Wood on the issuances in my sample, but it was represented by
Arnold & Porter in 2001 and thereafter. Arnold & Porter also represented
Brazil, and the language added in 2001 to the El Salvadoran bonds is identical to
significant portions of the Brazilian arbitration clause.210 Although the change in
El Salvadoran bond terms is modest, it is consistent with the view that law firms
and other repeat-player intermediaries can drive the adoption and dissemination
of new contract terms.211 I return to this topic below.212

207. Typically, the disclosure documents describe the terms of the underlying bonds in detail, but
occasionally the disclosures quote bond terms in full, as with the offering circulars for El Salvadoran
bonds described in the text. See THE REP. OF EL SAL., OFFERING CIRCULAR 3 (Jan. 24, 2000) (offering
10% fixed rate Notes due in 2007 and providing arbitration terms).
208. See THE REP. OF EL SAL., OFFERING CIRCULAR v (July 18, 2001) (offering 8.5% Notes due
in 2011). Issuers typically refuse to waive sovereign immunity for claims under U.S. securities laws. For
an explanation of the import of that refusal, see Choi & Gulati, supra note 138, at 1035–36 n.44.
209. THE REP. OF EL SAL., supra note 207, at 3.
210. In my sample, Arnold & Porter represented El Salvador on private issuances governed by
New York law in 2001, 2002, 2005, and 2006, and it represented Brazil on registered offerings in 1999
and 2007. Each issuer’s arbitration clause provides that:
• The arbitration is to be conducted under UNCITRAL rules “(excluding Article 26
thereof),” which authorizes the arbitrators to issue interim measures of protection upon
request;
• “The number of arbitrators shall be three, to be appointed in accordance with Section II
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules”;
• “The appointing authority shall be the Chairman of the International Court of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce”; and
• “The third arbitrator may be (but need not be) of the same nationality as any of the
parties to the arbitration.”
THE REP. OF EL SAL., supra note 154, at v; Cross, supra note 2, at app. 1 (quoting Fiscal Agency
Agreement, Braz.-Bank of N.Y. (successor-in-interest to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.), Nov. 1, 1996).
I cannot rule out the possibility that the underwriters or their lawyers were responsible for this change
to the El Salvadoran bonds. However, these firms do not overlap on the bonds in my sample.
211. E.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 935–37; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 736–40.
212. See infra notes 266–91 and accompanying text for a discussion of contract innovation,
including the role played by intermediaries.
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III. IMPLICATIONS
As it turns out, there is relatively substantial variance in the enforcementrelated contracting practices of different sovereign issuers. This variance includes
departures from the choice of forum “standard” by over twenty percent of the
issuers in the sample,213 including 9.7% who have issued bonds containing
arbitration clauses.214 Similarly situated issuers, moreover, sometimes make
different choices with respect to arbitration, although their reasons for doing so
are unclear.215 And there is additional variance in sovereign immunity terms,
although a sizeable majority of issuers waive immunity from both jurisdiction
and execution.216 At the same time, individual issuers rarely change their own
contracting practices.
This Part explores the potential implications of these findings. It begins,
however, with a cautionary note. As noted previously, it is difficult to discern the
forces that shape contracting practices.217 One reason for this is the obvious fact
that parties may have diverse preferences. Although it is tempting to assign
universal values to contract terms—to assume, say, that arbitration would benefit
or disadvantage all sovereign issuers in the same way—the reality is likely
different. Moreover, issuers may provoke different market reactions despite
using the same contract term. For example, collective action clauses (“CACs”)
allow a supermajority of bondholders (typically around seventy-five percent) to
modify key financial terms in sovereign bonds.218 There is some evidence that
issuers deemed to pose a low risk of default obtain pricing benefits by including
CACs in their bonds, while high-risk borrowers pay a premium.219 This pattern
suggests that market participants might interpret particular contract terms to
signal elevated risk, but only when adopted by certain classes of issuers.220 In
similar fashion, perhaps higher-risk issuers would pay a premium for departures
from the “standard” dispute resolution term. Such changes, after all, might signal

213. See supra notes 146–50 and Table 2 for further discussion of choice of forum.
214. See supra note 152 and accompanying text and Table 2 for those countries that expressly
permit arbitration. See supra note 152 for a discussion of how bondholders may sometimes invoke
arbitration provisions in bilateral investment treaties.
215. See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text for a discussion of these issuers.
216. See supra Part III.B.3 for a discussion of approaches to sovereign immunity from execution.
217. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty in drawing
conclusions from any given degree of standardization.
218. Until the inclusion of CACs became widespread, sovereign bonds governed by New York
law typically required unanimous bondholder consent. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1628–29.
219. Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing
Costs? An Update and Additional Results 8 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2363,
2000), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/eichengr/research/governinglawnew.pdf. For such
issuers, the desire to preserve future access to credit markets may adequately deter default and, “in the
exceptional circumstance that they have difficulties in servicing their debts, the fact that they can
resort to provisions facilitating the orderly restructuring of their obligations is viewed positively by the
markets.” Id. For high-risk borrowers, however, “the presence of collective-action clauses significantly
aggravates moral hazard and increases borrowing costs.” Id.
220. Id.
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that the parties are already thinking about the consequences of default.221 These
possibilities complicate any attempt to interpret actual contracting practices.
And the effort is complicated further by the vagaries of the contract drafting
process itself.222
Despite these qualifications, some conclusions begin to emerge from an
analysis of these sovereign bond contracts. First, there is little reason to presume
a strong and widely held preference for arbitration. Thus, the answer to the
“puzzle” of why more sovereign bond contracts do not choose arbitration may
be that few parties care to choose it, rather than anything having to do with
contract stickiness. Second, the sovereign debt literature’s emphasis on learning
and network effects, though perhaps legitimate, may have led observers to
assume greater uniformity across issuers than is in fact the case. The pattern
observed here suggests that contracting practices may be more diverse than is
often assumed. Finally, there are potential implications for the study of contract
innovation and change. In particular, the use of arbitration by relatively minor
players in the sovereign debt world calls for greater attention to the forces that
drive innovation among less-established and lower-status players.
A.

The Diminished Functional Case for Sovereign Debt Arbitration

To begin with the question of sovereign debt arbitration: Is there reason to
believe that market participants should strongly prefer arbitration to litigation?
There is cause for doubt. Recall the two primary advantages claimed for
arbitration over litigation: neutrality and ease of enforcement.223 Previously, I
expressed skepticism that many sovereign issuers view arbitration as significantly
more neutral than litigation, even when compared to New York or English
courts.224 Of course, it is an empirical question whether and under what
conditions issuers prefer arbitration to litigation, and my findings do not address
that question directly. They do, however, undercut an important component of
the claim that arbitration offers substantial enforcement advantages over
litigation.

221. Conversely, perhaps changes to these contract terms would be interpreted more negatively
for lower-risk issuers, who (by hypothesis) should give little if any thought to the consequences of
default.
222. For example, some have suggested that the early inclusion of collective action clauses in
New York-law bonds was due, at least in part, to the inadvertence of the drafting attorneys. See, e.g.,
Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law Bonds of
Sovereign Borrowers, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 815, 825–28 (2004) (attributing early inclusion of CACs in
some New York law bonds, at least in part, to inadvertence; in each case, underwriters were
represented by New York law firm’s London office, whose lawyers presumably began with standard
terms and conditions taken from English-law bonds, where CACs were standard). But see Anna
Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Innovation After the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond Contracts Since
2003, 4 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 85, 90 (2009) (suggesting that early adoption of CACs may have been “a
distinct mode of contractual innovation”).
223. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text for a further discussion of arbitration’s
claimed benefits over litigation.
224. See supra Part II.A.1 for a critical assessment of arbitration’s supposed neutrality benefit.
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A central argument for the superior enforceability of arbitration awards is
that, when seeking to execute on sovereign assets located in the United States,
the holder of a judgment based on an arbitration award need not show that the
property to be seized bears a nexus to the “commercial activity upon which the
claim is based.”225 Yet contract terms waiving sovereign immunity from
execution also confer this benefit, and over eighty-five percent of the issuers in
my sample include broad immunity waivers in their bonds.226 This practice
significantly weakens even the theoretical advantages arbitration might offer as
an enforcement tool.227
Of course, arbitration offers other potential benefits, such as limited judicial
review in countries where bondholders might seek to enforce an arbitration
award.228 But for reasons I have already discussed, these benefits are quite
speculative.229 Indeed, actual contracting practices suggest that market
participants generally share this skepticism. The most commonly used term,
which pairs a broad immunity waiver with a forum selection clause calling for
litigation, is consistent with commercial lending practices generally230 and
minimizes whatever potential enforcement benefits arbitration might offer. Any
residual enforcement benefits would have to be weighed against the potential
costs associated with the selection of a relatively untested—and unsubsidized—
forum. It may be that this calculus usually favors litigation. This conclusion
draws support from the fact that arbitration clauses appear with some frequency
when arbitration’s enforcement benefits are greatest. Thus, arbitration clauses
often appear when there is particular reason to doubt that the issuer’s courts will
enforce judgments rendered by foreign courts.231 The relatively frequent use of
arbitration in this context, and its infrequent use otherwise, suggests that market
participants generally do not perceive arbitration to offer significant
enforcement advantages.

225. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1), (a)(6) (2006) (permitting execution on property used for
commercial activity in United States if foreign state has waived immunity or if judgment is based on
order confirming arbitral award), with id. § 1610(a)(2) (permitting execution on property used for
commercial activity in United States only if property also “is or was used for the commercial activity
upon which the claim is based”).
226. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text for a discussion of this broad waiver of
immunity.
227. If an issuer will not agree to waive its immunity from execution, it is unclear why it would
agree to confer a similar benefit by agreeing to arbitration.
228. See supra notes 128–33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the minimal value of
limited judicial review in enforcing sovereign debt arbitration awards.
229. See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text for a discussion questioning the likelihood of
voluntary payments. See supra notes 128–33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limitations
of judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.
230. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text for a discussion of why arbitration clauses
appear infrequently in commercial lending contracts.
231. See supra notes 156–66 and accompanying text for a discussion of this explanation and its
limits.
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The Network Explanation Revisited

If the foregoing discussion is correct, there is no need to invoke network
theory, or any other theory of default rule stickiness, to explain the relatively
infrequent use of arbitration in sovereign bonds. Of course, this does not mean
that standardization poses no barrier to innovation—that it is literally irrelevant
to contracting practices. Widespread use of a term may deter innovation without
preventing it entirely.232 In fact, there is arguably some evidence consistent with
the presence of learning and network effects in the sample here. In particular, a
few countries, such as Kazakhstan and Moldova, have issued bonds that do not
include arbitration clauses even when arbitration might add some enforcement
value.233 There may be particular reasons why these former Soviet republics do
not use arbitration, but one might also characterize these failures to use
arbitration as evidence of network benefits associated with the choice of forum
standard. That is, these issuers adhere to the standard even when arbitration
might plausibly offer some enforcement advantages.
Nevertheless, several patterns apparent in sovereign debt contracting
practices suggest that the power of the dispute resolution “standard” may be
rather modest. First, it is not uncommon for issuers to depart from the choice of
forum standard or to include restrictive immunity waivers that may reduce the
effectiveness of enforcement proceedings. Thus, Russian bonds do not consent
to the jurisdiction of any court, in any jurisdiction.234 Likewise, bonds issued by
Australia and by Nova Scotia do not submit to the jurisdiction of any external
forum, although these issuers do consent to be sued in their own courts.235
Several other issuers, including China, Finland, Italy, and South Africa, have
issued bonds that submit to the jurisdiction of foreign courts but that do not
waive the issuer’s sovereign immunity from execution.236 A second pattern
involves the adoption of arbitration clauses by relatively new entrants to the
sovereign debt markets, including Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, and the Slovak
Republic.237 A third, and related, pattern is that when arbitration’s benefits are
most plausible—because the issuer’s courts may not enforce foreign court
judgments—arbitration clauses appear with some frequency.238 As noted
previously,239 a few issuers that apparently fall into this category do not use
arbitration, but these appear to be a minority.
232. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 729 (noting that, when present, “learning and
network benefits . . . increase the degree of contract standardization”).
233. See supra notes 164–66 and accompanying text for further discussion of these bonds.
234. Indeed, the offering documents caution that even Russian courts may “decline jurisdiction”
over suits brought to enforce defaulted debt obligations. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1998 OFFERING
CIRCULAR, supra note 148, at 90; THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1997 OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note
148, at 86.
235. See supra note 149 for more information on these bonds.
236. See supra note 184 and accompanying text for more information on these bonds.
237. See supra note 153 for more information on these bonds.
238. See supra notes 156–61 and accompanying text for a discussion of this use of arbitration.
239. See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text for a discussion of bonds issued by
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova.
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These patterns do not disprove the existence of learning and network
effects, but they are difficult to square with the claim that widespread use of the
default litigation term seriously deters issuers who wish to depart from the
standard. In each pattern, issuers forego the widely used dispute resolution term
in favor of a custom term. These departures from the standard add up. With
respect to choice of forum clauses alone, over twenty percent of the issuers
depart from the choice of forum standard, whether by providing for no
enforcement forum whatsoever, by submitting only to the jurisdiction of the
borrower’s own courts, or by submitting to arbitration either alone or in
conjunction with the jurisdiction of one or more foreign courts.240 There is
additional variance across issuers in sovereign immunity provisions. Because
contract terms are likely to be at their stickiest when market participants rarely
negotiate custom terms,241 the relatively frequent use of nonstandard terms
suggests that the stickiness of enforcement-related terms may be overstated.
The more intriguing pattern may be the general consistency within the
bonds issued by each issuer.242 If there is little evidence of potent learning and
network benefits accruing from widespread use of dispute resolution terms, the
evidence is consistent with the belief that established contracting practices are
difficult to change.243 There are exceptions. Poland and El Salvador, for
example, have issued bonds with varied dispute resolution terms.244 In general,
however, the issuers in this sample rarely changed their existing terms. Perhaps
this consistency evidences the presence of switching costs, or some other
mechanism that might deter changes to established dispute resolution terms. For
example, any change to enforcement-related terms might be interpreted to signal
an increased likelihood of default.245 In addition, because a default will likely
implicate multiple bond issuances, it may complicate matters for outstanding
bonds to be governed by different dispute resolution terms. Issuers could address
this problem by amending existing bonds, but it is potentially expensive to do
so.246 Finally, analysts and investors may have trouble assessing the pricing
implications of altered bond terms, and this may lead issuers to resist changing
established practices.
240. See supra notes 146–50 and Table 2 for a discussion of choice of forum.
241. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 3, at 653.
242. See supra notes 204–10 and accompanying text for a discussion of within-issuer consistency
in bond terms.
243. As noted previously, because the sample is not especially deep, these conclusions about
within-issuer consistency remain tentative.
244. See supra Part II.B.4 for a discussion of Poland and El Salvador’s issuance of bonds with
varied dispute resolution terms.
245. Cf. Waibel, supra note 2, at 732 n.131 (“[S]overeign bonds with arbitration clauses . . . could
implicitly recognize the possibility of eventual default and thereby negatively affect their
marketability; the inclusion of arbitration clauses is therefore generally avoided, leaving domestic
courts the forum of choice.”).
246. Once bonds have been issued, changes may require bondholder consent, and obtaining
consent is expensive. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 728 n.40. For a related discussion of
difficulties issuing new bonds with CACs, see Steven L. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1203 (2004).
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On further scrutiny, however, at least the first two of these arguments are
unconvincing. To begin with, they implicitly view arbitration as a litigation
substitute, and it may indeed serve that function in some cases. But existing
contracting practices also suggest that arbitration might be offered to creditors as
an additional disputing option. Thus, Estonia, Georgia, Poland, Ukraine, and the
Slovak Republic have all issued bonds permitting creditors to initiate arbitration
proceedings, litigation in English courts, or litigation before “any other court of
competent jurisdiction.”247 Even Brazil and El Salvador offer arbitration as an
alternative to litigation in the issuer’s own courts.248 Historically, of course,
litigation in the borrower’s courts has not been an appealing option to creditors,
although it is not unprecedented for lenders to confer exclusive jurisdiction on
those courts.249 Sovereign debt, however, is increasingly held by the issuer’s own
citizens.250 To the extent it becomes difficult to discriminate between foreign and
domestic bondholders, litigation in domestic courts may become a more
palatable option.251
If we conceptualize arbitration as an additional disputing forum available at
the option of creditors, it becomes harder to sustain the argument that issuers
would incur substantial costs adding an arbitration clause to existing bond terms.
The dispute resolution “standard” already contemplates litigation in multiple
forums, because issuers generally submit to the nonexclusive jurisdiction of New
York or English courts.252 Adding arbitration as a disputing option, while leaving
existing options intact, would simply expand the range of options already
available in the event of a default. Perhaps few issuers would agree to confer
such a benefit on holders of existing bonds. But given the range of forums
already available to bondholders,253 adding an arbitration clause to new bonds
would only modestly expand the number of forums in which issuers might have
to defend against bondholder claims.254 And finally, amending existing contracts
247. GEOR., supra note 159, at 81–82; REP. OF EST., supra note 155, at 9; THE REP. OF POL., supra
note 163, at 11; THE SLOVAK REP., supra note 159, at 16; UKR., OFFERING MEMORANDUM 49–50 (Feb.
9, 2000). The litigation option may be valuable to bondholders even if the issuer’s courts will not
recognize foreign court judgments, particularly with respect to assets located in other jurisdictions.
248. FEDERATIVE REP. OF BRAZ., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT 11 (Oct. 18, 1999) (supplement to
offering of 14.5% Bonds due in 2009); THE REP. OF EL SAL., OFFERING CIRCULAR iv (July 13, 2006)
(offering for 7.65% Notes due in 2035).
249. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 107, at 58 (recounting agreement by commercial banks to
submit to exclusive jurisdiction of sovereign courts after failing in their efforts to obtain arbitration
clause).
250. Gelpern, supra note 5, at 154.
251. It may also generate demand for other, standardized means of dispute resolution, such as
arbitration. Id. at 157–58.
252. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the choice of forum
standard.
253. In many cases, arbitration may already be an option for a subset of bondholders under
bilateral investment treaties between the issuer and their home countries. See supra note 152 for a
discussion of BITs.
254. Moreover, issuers who wished to harmonize the choice of forum terms in their outstanding
bonds could in many cases do so without substantial cost. Changes that do not adversely affect
bondholder interests may not require bondholder consent. See, e.g., REP. OF COSTA RICA, OFFERING
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to offer creditors additional disputing options hardly seems to signal increased
likelihood of default. If anything, such a change would signal the issuer’s
confidence in its ability to repay.
Nevertheless, it remains possible that pricing difficulties would deter issuers
from modifying established contracting practices.255 If issuers suspect that
arbitration will confer benefits on bondholders but do not see their borrowing
costs reduced accordingly, they may be reluctant to agree to such terms. Even
this possibility, however, remains speculative. As I have already discussed, the
evidence suggests that market participants do not view arbitration as a preferred
forum. Of course, preferences may change over time. Although there is a
substantial history of investor-state arbitration, there is little experience
arbitrating claims arising from defaulted sovereign bonds.256 ICSID tribunals,
however, are now presiding over arbitrations arising out of Argentina’s 2001
default.257 If experience with these proceedings gives creditors or issuers reasons
to prefer arbitration, we might expect contracts to adjust accordingly. The lack of
such an adjustment would provide some support for the stickiness explanation.
At present, however, there is little reason to suspect that existing choice of forum
provisions do not reflect contracting preferences. Understanding whether bond
terms are resistant to change will have to await some reason for change.
C.

Broader Implications: Contract Diversity and Innovation

Even if standardization poses little barrier to the adoption of preferred
enforcement-related terms, that does not mean it is irrelevant to sovereign debt
contracting practices. Some contract terms may be stickier than others.258 But
the findings reported here have some general implications for the study of

CIRCULAR 16 (Feb. 22, 2001) (offering 9% Notes due in 2011 and permitting Republic and Fiscal
Agent to modify Fiscal Agency Agreement or Notes without bondholder consent or vote “for the
purpose of . . . surrendering any rights or power conferred upon the Republic . . . or . . . in any manner
which shall not adversely affect the interest of any holder of Notes in any material respect”).
255. One explanation for the pattern suggested by my sample—that new issuers sometimes adopt
nonstandard terms but established terms rarely change—is that it may be easier for analysts and
investors to price entirely new bonds than it is to determine the pricing implications of slight
modifications to existing bond terms. As the text indicates, issuers might resist including arbitration
clauses if they suspect such clauses will confer benefits on bondholders but will not result in lower
borrowing costs.
256. For the most extensive empirical analysis of investor-state arbitration, see generally Franck,
supra note 100. One of the rare international arbitrations involving sovereign loans is the ICSID case
Fedax N.V. v. Rep. of Venezuela, involving a claim by an assignee of Venezuelan promissory notes.
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1391.
257. See Alemanni v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8 (registered Mar. 27, 2007).
These claims are subject to ICSID arbitration because bilateral investment treaties between Argentina
and the countries in which the bondholders are citizens provide for arbitration, not because Argentine
bonds permit arbitration. See supra note 152 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
bilateral investment treaty arbitration and its applicability to sovereign bonds.
258. For example, Professors Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati report evidence consistent with the
view that standardization, rather than preference, explains the widespread use of unanimous action
clauses in New York-law bonds before 2000. Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 963–66.
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sovereign debt and for research into contract innovation and change. This final
section briefly explores these implications.
Researchers who study contract change often focus (as I have done) on the
terms that pique their interest. Empirical analyses of sovereign debt, for
example, generally focus on particular contract terms, such as CACs,259 without
explicitly contemplating variance in terms other than the ones under study.260
This is consistent with the general understanding that sovereign debt instruments
are, for the most part, boilerplate. It is also consistent with network theory’s
emphasis on the benefits accruing from widespread use of contract terms. But
the sovereign debt literature’s emphasis on network theory, while legitimate,
may have led researchers to assume greater uniformity than in fact exists. The
diversity across issuers in largely overlooked, enforcement-related bond terms
undercuts this understanding and cautions that bond contracts may be less
standardized than is often thought.261 Indeed, recent research supports the claim
that sovereign debt markets may be characterized by “quiet experimentation.”262
If that is true, more robust models of sovereign debt contracting practices may
need to account for a messier reality, one in which contracts differ in multiple
ways.263
Indeed, there seems little reason to limit this conclusion to sovereign bond
contracts. In a variety of contexts, the term “boilerplate” may obscure a more
diverse set of contracting practices. Even boilerplate contracts, after all, can be
expected to contain some mix of standard and custom terms.264 The important
question raised by network theory—whether contracts reflect an optimal balance
between standardization and customization—cannot be answered without a clear
sense of how the parties have drawn that balance. Thus, enforcement-related
terms serve as another reminder that actual contracting practices can be
surprisingly diverse.265
259. See supra notes 218–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of CACs.
260. Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 993 (noting that prior studies comparing English- to New
York-law bonds assumed that bonds were identical except with respect to use of CACs); see also
Torbjörn Becker, Anthony Richards & Yunyong Thaicharoen, Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard:
Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?, 61 J. INT’L ECON. 127, 128 (2003) (studying effect on price of
bonds of including CACs); Eichengreen & Mody, supra note 219, at 1–16 (same).
261. Given the difficulty of enforcing sovereign debt obligations, see supra text accompanying
notes 6–17, and the limited attention they have received, see supra text accompanying note 135, one
might argue that enforcement-related terms are relatively minor components of sovereign bond
contracts. But this overlooks the central role choice of forum and other enforcement-related terms
may play in determining the significance of the major recent innovations in sovereign debt contracting
practices: for example, the widespread inclusion of CACs in New York-law bonds, or the creative use
of pari passu clauses to impede restructuring efforts. Litigation may play a significant role in shaping
the ultimate meaning and validity of these innovations.
262. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 222, at 18.
263. See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 993 (“Our examination of sovereign bond
contracts suggests that it is problematic to lump all the New York contracts together as being
identically situated in terms of the ease of restructuring them.”).
264. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 32, at 266 (explaining contracts as combinations of default
and custom terms).
265. Another example of significant variance in supposedly boilerplate contracts involves
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These results also implicate a larger body of scholarship examining the
conditions under which innovation is likely to occur. This literature yields a
number of hypotheses. Some theories link innovation to structural characteristics
such as firm size and market power. For example, one prediction is that large
firms, and those with greater market power, are most likely to innovate.266 These
firms have the size and scope to justify the investments, and capture the gains,
associated with innovation.267 A competing hypothesis predicts innovation by
firms with little market power and greater exposure to competitive pressure.268
A related sociological literature links innovation to party status and
suggests that innovation may occur among high-status and low-status firms.269
The theoretical basis for this prediction is that both high- and low-status firms
are securely established as players (or nonplayers) in the relevant category and
therefore have little to gain by conforming to audience expectations concerning
“proper” behavior by category members.270 Thus, high-status players are secure
in their group membership and may innovate to differentiate themselves from
competing firms or brand themselves as market leaders.271 Low-status firms are
not likely to be perceived as “players” no matter what they do.272 They may
innovate to establish a niche in a competitive marketplace populated by more
established firms.273 There is empirical support for the view that innovation may
occur among both high- and low-status players.274
Despite these theoretical and empirical grounds for expecting innovation by
less-established and low-status players, the sovereign debt and boilerplate
literatures have focused primarily on players with high status and significant
manufacturing contracts in the automotive industry. See Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White,
Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957–58
(2006) (studying form contracts drafted by Original Equipment Manufacturers).
266. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Empirical Studies of Financial Innovation: Lots of
Talk, Little Action?, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 116, 119 (2004).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 120; see also Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 935–36 (describing these theories as
applied to contract innovation).
269. Damon J. Phillips & Ezra W. Zuckerman, Middle-Status Conformity: Theoretical
Restatement and Empirical Demonstration in Two Markets, 107 AM. J. SOC. 379, 383–90 (2001).
270. Id. at 384–85.
271. Id. at 385.
272. Id.
273. E.g., Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private
Lawmaking, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 423, 451 (1993).
274. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited Liability: An Empirical
Study of New York Law Firms, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 107, 155 (focusing on New York law firms’
adoption of LLP form and concluding “elite firms adopted the new LLP form far more slowly than did
their less elite New York counterparts”); Phillips & Zuckerman, supra note 269, at 411–15 (studying
law firms in Silicon Valley and finding that low- and high-status firms were most likely to adopt family
law practices, traditionally viewed as a low-status practice area); Powell, supra note 273, at 451
(focusing on development of poison pill antitakeover device and concluding: “Lacking the stable client
base of older established firms, newcomers may have to adopt a specialist strategy in order to attract
clients and find their niche. The development of new legal devices and strategies heightens their
visibility and marketability to potential clients.”).

2009]

DISPUTING BOILERPLATE

51

market power. With respect to sovereign issuers, for example, most observers
trace the move from unanimous action clauses to CACs in New York-law bonds
to Mexico’s decision to include a CAC in a 2003 bond issuance.275 This view
dovetails neatly with the prediction that high-status players are likely to drive
innovation.276 Indeed, one impetus behind the decision may have been Mexico’s
desire to distinguish itself as a leader among sovereign issuers.277 The sovereign
debt and boilerplate literatures also highlight the role of large, repeat-player
intermediaries, especially lawyers and underwriters.278 For example, Professors
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati attribute the diffusion of CACs throughout New
York-law bonds to high volume issuer’s counsel such as Cleary Gottlieb.279 By
contrast, looking at corporate bonds, Professors Marcel Kahan and Michael
Klausner find that high volume underwriters play a role in coordinating issuers’
contract choices but no evidence that law firms play a similar role.280
My findings tell a similar story, but with a caveat discussed below. I did not
set out to explore the role of law firms and underwriters in producing contract
change, but my findings generally support the notion that high-volume
intermediaries play an important role in designing and disseminating contract
terms. Because I do not always have the first bond in which an issuer included an
arbitration clause, I cannot be certain which law firms and underwriters were
involved at that time. As a rough proxy, however, I can look to the firms
involved in the earliest issuance in the sample. The resulting picture is consistent
with the view that high-volume intermediaries can drive contract change. For
example, for each issuer of English law bonds that permit arbitration, Allen &
Overy or Linklaters acted as underwriter’s counsel on the earliest issuance in the
sample.281 These firms are major players; one or the other represented either the
issuer or the underwriter on most of the English-law issuances in my sample.282
275. E.g., Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 960; Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1698. But see
Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 222, at 6 (noting that “active experimentation” with CAC terms
continues among relatively small issuers in London market for New York- and English-law bonds).
276. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1698 (“Mexico’s sound economy and sterling reputation
made it the perfect first mover.”). But see id. at 1628 (noting that Kazakhstan had previously included
CAC in bond issuance but that “no one seemed to notice”).
277. See id. at 1696 (exploring Mexico’s initial adoption of CACs and concluding that “[t]o the
extent Mexico wanted to use the CAC incident to create a perception of autonomy and leadership, it
was wildly successful”).
278. Large law firms, for example, may devise new terms to solve frequently encountered
problems “with the incentive to diffuse their invention[s] in the market.” Id. at 1680–81.
279. Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 971–76.
280. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 753–60. Departing from the Choi-Gulati and KahanKlausner focus on high-volume intermediaries, Professors Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati tell a
somewhat different story with respect to Mexico’s initial decision to include CACs in its 2003 bonds.
Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 5, at 1680–82. The market participants they interviewed attributed the
decision to officials at the Mexican Finance Ministry without significant pressure from lawyers or
underwriters. Id.
281. Allen & Overy acted as underwriter’s counsel in issuances by Estonia (2002) and Ukraine
(2000), and Linklaters acted as underwriter’s counsel in issuances by Georgia (2008) and the Slovak
Republic (1999).
282. Overall, Allen & Overy acted as underwriter’s counsel in eight of the forty-six issuances
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By focusing on underwriter’s counsel, and not issuer’s counsel or the
underwriters themselves, I do not mean to weigh in on extant debates over which
set of intermediaries is more likely to produce and disseminate contract terms.283
Indeed, I have already described at least one occasion on which a change in the
issuer’s arbitration clause appears traceable to the law firm representing the
issuer.284 Rather, I emphasize only that my findings suggest that researchers are
right to focus on major intermediaries as agents of contract change.
The caveat is that much of the arbitration usage is by less-established and
lower-status issuers, such as Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, and the Slovak Republic.
This pattern is consistent with predictions of innovation among smaller and lowstatus players, as well as with recent research finding some smaller issuers
engaged in “active experimentation” with CAC terms.285 But the theory
underlying these predictions may not be a good fit for the pattern I observe. That
theory emphasizes that lower-status players may feel less pressure to conform to
audience norms concerning “proper” behavior.286 As a result, even modest
potential benefits may be sufficient to induce departures from the norm.287
Extending this theory to the sovereign debt context, we might explain the use of
arbitration by relatively low-status issuers as attempts to distinguish their bonds
from those of competing issuers by adding arbitration to a menu of traditional
disputing options.288 Yet this seems an awkward explanation for the pattern of
arbitration use. If it is indeed the case that issuers primarily use arbitration when
there is doubt as to the enforceability of foreign court judgments,289 then
arbitration effectively substitutes for the standard in cases where, for one reason
or another, the standard cannot be used. Put differently, innovation occurs
because the standard is unavailable or unsatisfactory, not because lower-status
issuers feel less pressure to conform to the standard or because they need to
distinguish their bonds in a crowded marketplace.

(17.4%) and as issuer’s counsel in another thirteen (18.3%). Linklaters acted as underwriter’s counsel
in sixteen issuances (34.8%) and as issuer’s counsel in another three (6.5%). Both firms were involved
in two of the issuances. Thus, one firm or the other represented either the issuer or the underwriters in
thirty-eight of the forty-six English-law issuances (82.6%).
283. Compare Choi & Gulati, supra note 18, at 975–76 (finding evidence that high-volume
issuer’s counsel, but not high-volume underwriter’s counsel or underwriters, were associated with
switch to CACs), with Kahan & Klausner, supra note 35, at 753–60 (finding evidence that
underwriters, but not law firms, play a role in coordinating issuers’ selection of bond terms and in
promoting diffusion of learning benefits).
284. Recall that, in 2001, El Salvador changed its arbitration clause to incorporate nearly
verbatim provisions that had long been included in Brazilian bonds, and that the agent responsible for
this change appears to have been Arnold & Porter, the law firm representing both issuers. See supra
text accompanying notes 207–11 for a discussion of this change.
285. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 222, at 6.
286. See supra notes 269, 272 and accompanying text for a discussion of the theory behind lowstatus players’ pressure to conform.
287. E.g., Phillips & Zuckerman, supra note 269, at 385.
288. This explanation would best apply to the former Soviet republics. See supra notes 154–55
and accompanying text for a discussion of traditional disputing options in various jurisdictions.
289. See supra notes 156–61 and accompanying text for examples of this use of arbitration.
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It is unclear which of these views best describes the adoption of arbitration
clauses in sovereign bonds. The latter seems more consistent with the generally
overlooked status of choice of forum terms,290 and also with the fact that issuers
who use arbitration disclose, but hardly advertise, that fact.291 But no definitive
answer is available at this point. At a minimum, however, these findings provide
further evidence that innovation can occur among lower-status players. And they
suggest that the usual theoretical explanations may not account for the full range
of such innovation.
CONCLUSION
Is the relative absence of arbitration clauses from sovereign bond contracts
a puzzle to be solved? As it turns out, perhaps not. The theoretical case for
arbitration is uncertain. There is no reason to dismiss it out of hand as a potential
forum for resolving sovereign debt disputes, but there is certainly no reason to
presume that issuers or bondholders should strongly prefer it. The empirical
reality is consistent with this skeptical view of sovereign debt arbitration. Most
issuers use sovereign immunity terms to confer enforcement benefits similar to
those claimed for arbitration. This practice reduces arbitration’s potential
advantages, while avoiding its potential uncertainty and cost. And where
arbitration’s enforcement benefits are most plausible, it is used with some
frequency. At a minimum, these patterns suggest that theories of contract
stickiness are not necessary to explain the choice of dispute resolution term.
When combined with the surprising diversity of practices across issuers, these
patterns also suggest that the benefits of widespread use may be overstated in
this context.
More broadly, the diversity of contracting practices suggests that sovereign
bond contracts may be less uniform than is often assumed and that smaller,
lower-status issuers may be sources of experimentation and innovation. Major
intermediaries like law firms and underwriters may play a role in designing and
disseminating contract terms, but bit players, too, may be worthy of attention.
And perhaps most of all, these findings serve as a reminder that we should not
simply presume that standardization seriously impacts contract choice. Default
rules and terms may indeed be sticky. But just how sticky is the question, and it
may demand a diversity of answers to reflect the vast diversity of contracting
contexts.

290. For example, public officials have devoted little attention to these terms. See supra note 135
and accompanying text for a discussion of public officials’ efforts to identify optimal bond terms.
291. Typically, the disclosure documents prominently disclose the risk that bondholders will not
be able to enforce judgments against defaulted issuers, and the arbitration provision is often discussed
in this section as well. E.g., THE REP. OF EL SAL., supra note 248, at iv.
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Appendix
Governing Law and Submission to Jurisdiction292
The Fiscal Agency Agreement and the Notes shall be construed and
interpreted in accordance with the law of the State of New York, which shall
govern them and any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to any of
them, without reference to conflicts of laws principles. The Republic irrevocably
agrees for the benefit of each Holder of Notes that the courts of the State of New
York and of the United States sitting in The City of New York, Borough of
Manhattan, shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction to settle any disputes which may
arise out of or in connection with the Fiscal Agency Agreement or the Notes and
that, accordingly, any suit, action or proceedings arising out of or in connection
therewith (together referred to as “Related Proceedings”) may be brought in any
such courts. Related Proceedings may also be brought in the courts of the
Republic. The Republic irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of the courts
referred to in this Condition for purposes of any Related Proceedings.
To the extent that the Republic may in any jurisdiction claim or acquire for
itself or its assets immunity (sovereign or otherwise) from suit, execution,
attachment (whether in aid of execution, before judgment or otherwise) or other
legal process (whether through service or notice or otherwise), the Republic
irrevocably agrees for the benefit of the Holders of Notes not to claim, and
irrevocably waives, such immunity, to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of
such jurisdiction. The waiver of immunity in this paragraph shall have the fullest
scope permitted under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 of the
United States and is intended to be irrevocable for purposes of such Act but
shall otherwise constitute a limited and specific waiver for the purpose of the
Fiscal Agency Agreement and the Notes and under no circumstances shall it be
interpreted as a general waiver by the Republic or a waiver of immunity in
respect of property that is used solely or principally for official purposes (such as
ambassadorial and consular real property and buildings and the contents thereof,
or any bank accounts of embassies or consulates to the extent of monies
maintained therein for ambassadorial, consular or other official purposes, but
not commercial purposes, in each case necessary for the proper official,
ambassadorial or consular functioning of the Republic).
The Republic irrevocably appoints the person who from time to time is the
Consul of the Republic in The City of New York as it [sic] agent in the United
States to receive service of process in any Related Proceedings in The City of
New York based on or in connection with the Fiscal Agency Agreement or any
of the Notes.

292. THE LEBANESE REP., supra note 21, at 99–100.

